Vote Summary
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
BERRY GLOBAL GROUP, INC.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
Security
|
08579W103
|
Meeting Type
|
Annual
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Ticker Symbol
|
BERY
|
Meeting Date
|
16-Feb-2022
|
||||||||||||||||||||
ISIN
|
US08579W1036
|
Agenda
|
935541551 - Management
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Record Date
|
28-Dec-2021
|
Holding Recon Date
|
28-Dec-2021
|
||||||||||||||||||||
City /
|
Country
|
/
|
United
States
|
Vote Deadline
|
15-Feb-2022 11:59 PM ET
|
||||||||||||||||||
SEDOL(s)
|
Quick Code
|
||||||||||||||||||||||
Item
|
Proposal
|
Proposed
by
|
Vote
|
Management
Recommendation
|
For/Against
Management
|
||||||||||||||||||
1A.
|
Election of Director: B. Evan Bayh
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: Affiliated Outside director serving as a member of the Compensation Committee
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or
more is considered affiliated, with the exception of diverse nominees.
We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be
comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice.
Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Needs
Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held
accountable for such a poor rating and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and
procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term
interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives
critical to the Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1B.
|
Election of Director: Jonathan F. Foster
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of
Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held
accountable for such a poor rating and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and
procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term
interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives
critical to the Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1C.
|
Election of Director: Idalene F. Kesner
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1D.
|
Election of Director: Jill A. Rahman
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1E.
|
Election of Director: Carl J. Rickertsen
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of
Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held
accountable for such a poor rating and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and
procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term
interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives
critical to the Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1F.
|
Election of Director: Thomas E. Salmon
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1G.
|
Election of Director: Paula A. Sneed
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1H.
|
Election of Director: Robert A. Steele
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1I.
|
Election of Director: Stephen E. Sterrett
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1J.
|
Election of Director: Scott B. Ullem
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of
Needs Attention Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held
accountable for such a poor rating and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and
procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term
interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives
critical to the Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
2.
|
To ratify the selection of Ernst & Young LLP
as Berry's independent registered public
accountants for the fiscal year ending
October 1, 2022.
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Rating we give this auditor.
Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has
earned a grade of Some Concerns and thus, has failed to pass our model.
After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that
shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST
this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
3.
|
To approve, on an advisory, non-binding
basis, our executive compensation.
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we
believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's
directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not
effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote
AGAINST this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
APPLE INC.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
Security
|
037833100
|
Meeting Type
|
Annual
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Ticker Symbol
|
AAPL
|
Meeting Date
|
04-Mar-2022
|
||||||||||||||||||||
ISIN
|
US0378331005
|
Agenda
|
935541549 - Management
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Record Date
|
03-Jan-2022
|
Holding Recon Date
|
03-Jan-2022
|
||||||||||||||||||||
City /
|
Country
|
/
|
United
States
|
Vote Deadline
|
03-Mar-2022 11:59 PM ET
|
||||||||||||||||||
SEDOL(s)
|
Quick Code
|
||||||||||||||||||||||
Item
|
Proposal
|
Proposed
by
|
Vote
|
Management
Recommendation
|
For/Against
Management
|
||||||||||||||||||
1A.
|
Election of Director: James Bell
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1B.
|
Election of Director: Tim Cook
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1C.
|
Election of Director: Al Gore
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is
considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit,
Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for
sound corporate governance practice.
F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs
Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for
such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are
centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its
shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the
Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes
that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a
whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the
performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be
proposed in the future.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1D.
|
Election of Director: Alex Gorsky
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1E.
|
Election of Director: Andrea Jung
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some
Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for
such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are
centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its
shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the
Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes
that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a
whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the
performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be
proposed in the future.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1F.
|
Election of Director: Art Levinson
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is
considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit,
Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for
sound corporate governance practice.
F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs
Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for
such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are
centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its
shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the
Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes
that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a
whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the
performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be
proposed in the future.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1G.
|
Election of Director: Monica Lozano
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1H.
|
Election of Director: Ron Sugar
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is
considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit,
Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for
sound corporate governance practice.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1I.
|
Election of Director: Sue Wagner
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
2.
|
Ratification of the appointment of Ernst &
Young LLP as Apple's independent
registered public accounting firm for fiscal
2022.
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor.
Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has
earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model.
After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that
shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST
this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
3.
|
Advisory vote to approve executive
compensation.
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we
believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's
directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not
effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote
AGAINST this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
4.
|
Approval of the Apple Inc. 2022 Employee
Stock Plan.
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: After taking into account the maximum amount of shareholder equity dilution this proposal could
cause, as well as both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that
shareholders should not support the passage of this plan as proposed by the board of directors. We
recommend the board seek to align CEO pay more closely with the performance of the company and work
to reduce the cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. Therefore, we recommend a vote
AGAINST this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
5.
|
A shareholder proposal entitled
"Reincorporate with Deeper Purpose".
|
Shareholder
|
Against
|
Against
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
6.
|
A shareholder proposal entitled
"Transparency Reports".
|
Shareholder
|
For
|
Against
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: We believe that approval of the proposal will reduce the posed significant legal, reputational,
and financial risk to Apple and its shareholders brought by lack of transparency that affects freedom of
expression or access to information. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in
accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
7.
|
A shareholder proposal entitled "Report on
Forced Labor".
|
Shareholder
|
For
|
Against
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: We believe that transparency is important for evaluating risks and ensuring that investors and
stakeholders have adequate information necessary to make informed decisions. Accordingly, we
recommend a vote FOR this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
8.
|
A shareholder proposal entitled "Pay
Equity".
|
Shareholder
|
For
|
Against
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: We believe that approval of the proposal is necessary and warranted in the Company. Pay
disparities by gender and race in companies, in our view, could bring operational risks and reputational
damage that is detrimental to shareholder value. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder
proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
9.
|
A shareholder proposal entitled "Civil Rights
Audit".
|
Shareholder
|
For
|
Against
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: We believe that a company's success depends upon its ability to embrace diversity in the
community it serves. As such, we believe that adoption of this proposal is in the best interests of the
Company and its shareholders. As such, in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Guidelines, we recommend a
vote FOR this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
10.
|
A shareholder proposal entitled "Report on
Concealment Clauses".
|
Shareholder
|
For
|
Against
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: We believe that transparency is important for evaluating risks and ensuring that investors and
stakeholders have adequate information necessary to make informed decisions. Accordingly, we
recommend a vote FOR this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
BRIGHTVIEW HOLDINGS, INC.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
Security
|
10948C107
|
Meeting Type
|
Annual
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Ticker Symbol
|
BV
|
Meeting Date
|
08-Mar-2022
|
||||||||||||||||||||
ISIN
|
US10948C1071
|
Agenda
|
935543593 - Management
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Record Date
|
12-Jan-2022
|
Holding Recon Date
|
12-Jan-2022
|
||||||||||||||||||||
City /
|
Country
|
/
|
United
States
|
Vote Deadline
|
07-Mar-2022 11:59 PM ET
|
||||||||||||||||||
SEDOL(s)
|
Quick Code
|
||||||||||||||||||||||
Item
|
Proposal
|
Proposed
by
|
Vote
|
Management
Recommendation
|
For/Against
Management
|
||||||||||||||||||
1.
|
DIRECTOR
|
Management
|
|||||||||||||||||||||
1
|
James R. Abrahamson
|
Withheld
|
For
|
Against
|
|||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation
score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
2
|
Jane Okun Bomba
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
|||||||||||||||||||
3
|
Frank Lopez
|
Withheld
|
For
|
Against
|
|||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation
score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
4
|
Andrew V. Masterman
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
|||||||||||||||||||
5
|
Paul E. Raether
|
Withheld
|
For
|
Against
|
|||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is
considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit,
Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for
sound corporate governance practice.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
6
|
Richard W. Roedel
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
|||||||||||||||||||
7
|
Mara Swan
|
Withheld
|
For
|
Against
|
|||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation
score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
8
|
Joshua T. Weisenbeck
|
Withheld
|
For
|
Against
|
|||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is
considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit,
Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for
sound corporate governance practice.
F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some
Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
2.
|
To approve, on an advisory basis, the
compensation of our named executive
officers.
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we
believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's
directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not
effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote
AGAINST this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
3.
|
To ratify the appointment of Deloitte &
Touche LLP as BrightView Holdings, Inc.'s
independent registered public accounting
firm for 2022.
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor.
Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has
earned a grade of Some Concerns and thus, has failed to pass our model.
After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that
shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST
this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
NESTLE S.A.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
Security
|
641069406
|
Meeting Type
|
Annual
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Ticker Symbol
|
NSRGY
|
Meeting Date
|
07-Apr-2022
|
||||||||||||||||||||
ISIN
|
US6410694060
|
Agenda
|
935561464 - Management
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Record Date
|
01-Mar-2022
|
Holding Recon Date
|
01-Mar-2022
|
||||||||||||||||||||
City /
|
Country
|
/
|
United
States
|
Vote Deadline
|
30-Mar-2022 11:59 PM ET
|
||||||||||||||||||
SEDOL(s)
|
Quick Code
|
||||||||||||||||||||||
Item
|
Proposal
|
Proposed
by
|
Vote
|
Management
Recommendation
|
For/Against
Management
|
||||||||||||||||||
1A
|
Approval of the Annual Review, the
financial statements of Nestlé S.A. and the
consolidated financial statements of the
Nestlé Group for 2021
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1B
|
Acceptance of the Compensation Report
2021 (advisory vote)
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
2
|
Discharge to the members of the Board of
Directors and of the Management
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
3
|
Appropriation of profit resulting from the
balance sheet of Nestlé S.A. (proposed
dividend) for the financial year 2021
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
4AA
|
Re-election of the member of the Board of
Director: Paul Bulcke, as member and
Chairman
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: Over-Boarded (Board Chair)
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Chairman, being responsible for the leadership of the Board
and the creation of the conditions necessary for overall board and individual director effectiveness, should
hold no more than one other public directorship to ensure the valuable and prudent exercise of his/her
fiduciary duties as a Chairman and that his/her integrity and efficiency are not compromised
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
4AB
|
Re-election of the member of the Board of
Director: Ulf Mark Schneider
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
4AC
|
Re-election of the member of the Board of
Director: Henri de Castries
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
4AD
|
Re-election of the member of the Board of
Director: Renato Fassbind
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
4AE
|
Re-election of the member of the Board of
Director: Pablo Isla
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
4AF
|
Re-election of the member of the Board of
Director: Eva Cheng
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
4AG
|
Re-election of the member of the Board of
Director: Patrick Aebischer
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
4AH
|
Re-election of the member of the Board of
Director: Kimberly A. Ross
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
4AI
|
Re-election of the member of the Board of
Director: Dick Boer
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
4AJ
|
Re-election of the member of the Board of
Director: Dinesh Paliwal
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
4AK
|
Re-election of the member of the Board of
Director: Hanne Jimenez de Mora
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
4AL
|
Re-election of the member of the Board of
Director: Lindiwe Majele Sibanda
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
4BA
|
Election to the Board of Director: Chris
Leong
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
4BB
|
Election to the Board of Director: Luca
Maestri
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
4CA
|
Election of the member of the
Compensation Committee: Pablo Isla
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
4CB
|
Election of the member of the
Compensation Committee: Patrick
Aebischer
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
4CC
|
Election of the member of the
Compensation Committee: Dick Boer
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
4CD
|
Election of the member of the
Compensation Committee: Dinesh Paliwal
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
4D
|
Election of the statutory auditors Ernst &
Young Ltd, Lausanne branch
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor.
Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral. This audit firm has earned a
grade of Some Concerns and thus, has failed to pass our model.
After, taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that
shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST
this Resolution.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
4E
|
Election of the Independent Representative
Hartmann Dreyer, Attorneys-at-law
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
5A
|
Approval of the compensation of the Board
of Directors
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
5B
|
Approval of the compensation of the
Executive Board
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
6
|
Capital reduction (by cancellation of shares)
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
7
|
In the event of any yet unknown new or
modified proposal by a shareholder during
the General Meeting, I instruct the
Independent Representative to vote as
follows.
|
Management
|
Against
|
Against
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
WHIRLPOOL CORPORATION
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
Security
|
963320106
|
Meeting Type
|
Annual
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Ticker Symbol
|
WHR
|
Meeting Date
|
19-Apr-2022
|
||||||||||||||||||||
ISIN
|
US9633201069
|
Agenda
|
935557085 - Management
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Record Date
|
22-Feb-2022
|
Holding Recon Date
|
22-Feb-2022
|
||||||||||||||||||||
City /
|
Country
|
/
|
United
States
|
Vote Deadline
|
18-Apr-2022 11:59 PM ET
|
||||||||||||||||||
SEDOL(s)
|
Quick Code
|
||||||||||||||||||||||
Item
|
Proposal
|
Proposed
by
|
Vote
|
Management
Recommendation
|
For/Against
Management
|
||||||||||||||||||
1A.
|
Election of Director: Samuel R. Allen
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is
considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit,
Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for
sound corporate governance practice.
F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some
Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1B.
|
Election of Director: Marc R. Bitzer
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1C.
|
Election of Director: Greg Creed
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation
score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1D.
|
Election of Director: Gary T. DiCamillo
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is
considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit,
Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for
sound corporate governance practice.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1E.
|
Election of Director: Diane M. Dietz
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation
score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1F.
|
Election of Director: Gerri T. Elliott
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation
score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1G.
|
Election of Director: Jennifer A. LaClair
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1H.
|
Election of Director: John D. Liu
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1I.
|
Election of Director: James M. Loree
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation
score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1J.
|
Election of Director: Harish Manwani
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation
score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1K.
|
Election of Director: Patricia K. Poppe
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1L.
|
Election of Director: Larry O. Spencer
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1M.
|
Election of Director: Michael D. White
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is
considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit,
Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for
sound corporate governance practice.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
2.
|
Advisory vote to approve Whirlpool
Corporation's executive compensation.
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we
believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's
directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not
effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote
AGAINST this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
3.
|
Ratification of the appointment of Ernst &
Young LLP as Whirlpool Corporation's
independent registered public accounting
firm for 2022.
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor.
Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has
earned a grade of Some Concerns and thus, has failed to pass our model.
After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that
shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST
this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
APTIV PLC
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
Security
|
G6095L109
|
Meeting Type
|
Annual
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Ticker Symbol
|
APTV
|
Meeting Date
|
27-Apr-2022
|
||||||||||||||||||||
ISIN
|
JE00B783TY65
|
Agenda
|
935560309 - Management
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Record Date
|
02-Mar-2022
|
Holding Recon Date
|
02-Mar-2022
|
||||||||||||||||||||
City /
|
Country
|
/
|
United
States
|
Vote Deadline
|
22-Apr-2022 11:59 PM ET
|
||||||||||||||||||
SEDOL(s)
|
Quick Code
|
||||||||||||||||||||||
Item
|
Proposal
|
Proposed
by
|
Vote
|
Management
Recommendation
|
For/Against
Management
|
||||||||||||||||||
1A.
|
Election of Director: Kevin P. Clark
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1B.
|
Election of Director: Richard L. Clemmer
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1C.
|
Election of Director: Nancy E. Cooper
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1D.
|
Election of Director: Joseph L. Hooley
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1E.
|
Election of Director: Merit E. Janow
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1F.
|
Election of Director: Sean O. Mahoney
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is
considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit,
Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for
sound corporate governance practice.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1G.
|
Election of Director: Paul M. Meister
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1H.
|
Election of Director: Robert K. Ortberg
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1I.
|
Election of Director: Colin J. Parris
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1J.
|
Election of Director: Ana G. Pinczuk
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
2.
|
Proposal to re-appoint auditors, ratify
independent public accounting firm and
authorize the directors to determine the
fees paid to the auditors.
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor.
Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has
earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model.
After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that
shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST
this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
3.
|
Say-on-Pay - To approve, by advisory vote,
executive compensation.
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
GLOBAL PAYMENTS INC.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
Security
|
37940X102
|
Meeting Type
|
Annual
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Ticker Symbol
|
GPN
|
Meeting Date
|
28-Apr-2022
|
||||||||||||||||||||
ISIN
|
US37940X1028
|
Agenda
|
935564585 - Management
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Record Date
|
04-Mar-2022
|
Holding Recon Date
|
04-Mar-2022
|
||||||||||||||||||||
City /
|
Country
|
/
|
United
States
|
Vote Deadline
|
27-Apr-2022 11:59 PM ET
|
||||||||||||||||||
SEDOL(s)
|
Quick Code
|
||||||||||||||||||||||
Item
|
Proposal
|
Proposed
by
|
Vote
|
Management
Recommendation
|
For/Against
Management
|
||||||||||||||||||
1A.
|
Election of Director: F. Thaddeus Arroyo
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1B.
|
Election of Director: Robert H.B. Baldwin,
Jr.
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1C.
|
Election of Director: John G. Bruno
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation
score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1D.
|
Election of Director: Kriss Cloninger III
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation
score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1E.
|
Election of Director: Joia M. Johnson
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation
score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1F.
|
Election of Director: Ruth Ann Marshall
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1G.
|
Election of Director: Connie D. McDaniel
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1H.
|
Election of Director: William B. Plummer
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1I.
|
Election of Director: Jeffrey S. Sloan
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1J.
|
Election of Director: John T. Turner
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1K.
|
Election of Director: M. Troy Woods
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
2.
|
Approval, on an advisory basis, of the
compensation of our named executive
officers for 2021.
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we
believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's
directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not
effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote
AGAINST this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
3.
|
Ratification of the appointment of Deloitte &
Touche LLP as our independent registered
public accounting firm for the year ending
December 31, 2022.
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor.
Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has
earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model.
After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that
shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST
this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
4.
|
Advisory vote on shareholder proposal
regarding shareholders' right to call a
special meeting.
|
Shareholder
|
For
|
Against
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: We believe that this proposal is consistent with best corporate governance practices and in the
best interests of the shareholders to permit holders of 25% or more of the Company's outstanding shares of
common stock to call special meetings of shareholders. After evaluating the details pursuant to the
shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote
FOR this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
CROWN HOLDINGS, INC.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
Security
|
228368106
|
Meeting Type
|
Annual
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Ticker Symbol
|
CCK
|
Meeting Date
|
28-Apr-2022
|
||||||||||||||||||||
ISIN
|
US2283681060
|
Agenda
|
935573700 - Management
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Record Date
|
08-Mar-2022
|
Holding Recon Date
|
08-Mar-2022
|
||||||||||||||||||||
City /
|
Country
|
/
|
United
States
|
Vote Deadline
|
27-Apr-2022 11:59 PM ET
|
||||||||||||||||||
SEDOL(s)
|
Quick Code
|
||||||||||||||||||||||
Item
|
Proposal
|
Proposed
by
|
Vote
|
Management
Recommendation
|
For/Against
Management
|
||||||||||||||||||
1.
|
DIRECTOR
|
Management
|
|||||||||||||||||||||
1
|
Timothy J. Donahue
|
Withheld
|
For
|
Against
|
|||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F21 Combined CEO and Board Chair Positions and the Company Earns a Board Score of
Some Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that there is an inherent potential conflict, in having the CEO or former
CEO serve as the Chairman of the Board. Consequently, we prefer that companies focus on the following
areas to improve its corporate governance practices: separate the roles of the Chairman and CEO, hold
annual director elections, have one class of voting stock only, have key board committees consisting of
independent directors and majority of independent directors on board and include non-binding
compensation vote on agenda to further ensure board independence and accountability.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
2
|
Richard H. Fearon
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
|||||||||||||||||||
3
|
Andrea J. Funk
|
Withheld
|
For
|
Against
|
|||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some
Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for
such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are
centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its
shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the
Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes
that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a
whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the
performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be
proposed in the future.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
4
|
Stephen J. Hagge
|
Withheld
|
For
|
Against
|
|||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some
Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for
such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are
centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the
Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes
that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a
whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the
performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be
proposed in the future.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
5
|
James H. Miller
|
Withheld
|
For
|
Against
|
|||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is
considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit,
Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for
sound corporate governance practice.
F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs
Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for
such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are
centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its
shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the
Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes
that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a
whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the
performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be
proposed in the future.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
6
|
Josef M. Müller
|
Withheld
|
For
|
Against
|
|||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is
considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit,
Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for
sound corporate governance practice.
F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs
Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for
such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are
centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its
shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the
Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes
that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a
whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the
performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be
proposed in the future.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
7
|
B. Craig Owens
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
|||||||||||||||||||
8
|
Caesar F. Sweitzer
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
|||||||||||||||||||
9
|
Marsha C. Williams
|
Withheld
|
For
|
Against
|
|||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some
Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for
such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are
centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its
shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the
Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes
that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a
whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the
performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be
proposed in the future.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
10
|
Dwayne A. Wilson
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
|||||||||||||||||||
2.
|
Ratification of the appointment of
independent auditors for the fiscal year
ending December 31, 2022.
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor.
Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has
earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model.
After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that
shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST
this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
3.
|
Approval by advisory vote of the resolution
on executive compensation as described in
the Proxy Statement.
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we
believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's
directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not
effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote
AGAINST this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
4.
|
Adoption of the 2022 Stock-Based Incentive
Compensation Plan.
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: After taking into account the maximum amount of shareholder equity dilution this proposal could
cause, as well as both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that
shareholders should not support the passage of this plan as proposed by the board of directors. We
recommend the board seek to align CEO pay more closely with the performance of the company and work
to reduce the cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. Therefore, we recommend a vote
AGAINST this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
5.
|
Consideration of a Shareholder's proposal
requesting the Board of Directors to adopt
shareholder special meeting rights.
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: We believe that this proposal is consistent with best corporate governance practices and in the
best interests of the shareholders to permit holders of at least 10% or more of the Company's outstanding
shares of common stock to call special meetings of shareholders. After evaluating the details pursuant to
the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote
AGAINST this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
Security
|
084670702
|
Meeting Type
|
Annual
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Ticker Symbol
|
BRKB
|
Meeting Date
|
30-Apr-2022
|
||||||||||||||||||||
ISIN
|
US0846707026
|
Agenda
|
935562137 - Management
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Record Date
|
02-Mar-2022
|
Holding Recon Date
|
02-Mar-2022
|
||||||||||||||||||||
City /
|
Country
|
/
|
United
States
|
Vote Deadline
|
29-Apr-2022 11:59 PM ET
|
||||||||||||||||||
SEDOL(s)
|
Quick Code
|
||||||||||||||||||||||
Item
|
Proposal
|
Proposed
by
|
Vote
|
Management
Recommendation
|
For/Against
Management
|
||||||||||||||||||
1.
|
DIRECTOR
|
Management
|
|||||||||||||||||||||
1
|
Warren E. Buffett
|
Withheld
|
For
|
Against
|
|||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F21 Combined CEO and Board Chair Positions and the Company Earns a Board Score of
Some Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that there is an inherent potential conflict, in having the CEO or former
CEO serve as the Chairman of the Board. Consequently, we prefer that companies focus on the following
areas to improve its corporate governance practices: separate the roles of the Chairman and CEO, hold
annual director elections, have one class of voting stock only, have key board committees consisting of
independent directors and majority of independent directors on board and include non-binding
compensation vote on agenda to further ensure board independence and accountability.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
2
|
Charles T. Munger
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
|||||||||||||||||||
3
|
Gregory E. Abel
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
|||||||||||||||||||
4
|
Howard G. Buffett
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
|||||||||||||||||||
5
|
Susan A. Buffett
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
|||||||||||||||||||
6
|
Stephen B. Burke
|
Withheld
|
For
|
Against
|
|||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is
considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit,
Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for
sound corporate governance practice.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
7
|
Kenneth I. Chenault
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
|||||||||||||||||||
8
|
Christopher C. Davis
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
|||||||||||||||||||
9
|
Susan L. Decker
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
|||||||||||||||||||
10
|
David S. Gottesman
|
Withheld
|
For
|
Against
|
|||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is
considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit,
Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for
sound corporate governance practice.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
11
|
Charlotte Guyman
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
|||||||||||||||||||
12
|
Ajit Jain
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
|||||||||||||||||||
13
|
Ronald L. Olson
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
|||||||||||||||||||
14
|
Wallace R. Weitz
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
|||||||||||||||||||
15
|
Meryl B. Witmer
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
|||||||||||||||||||
2.
|
Shareholder proposal regarding the
adoption of a policy requiring that the Board
Chair be an independent director.
|
Shareholder
|
For
|
Against
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: We believe that there is an inherent potential conflict, in having an Inside director serve as the
Chairman of the board. Consequently, we prefer that companies separate the roles of the Chairman and
CEO and that the Chairman be independent to further ensure board independence and accountability. After
evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy
Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
3.
|
Shareholder proposal regarding the
publishing of an annual assessment
addressing how the Corporation manages
climate risks.
|
Shareholder
|
For
|
Against
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: We believe that the report on climate change will develop new methods that can be applied
globally when sufficient observations exist. Acknowledging climate change as an inevitable factor, and
recognizing the need to adapt, involves bold decisions by business. Therefore, we believe that companies
should review how climate change impacts the economy and portfolio companies and evaluate how
shareholder resolutions on climate change may impact long-term shareholder value as it votes proxies.
After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones'
Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
4.
|
Shareholder proposal regarding how the
Corporation intends to measure, disclose
and reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
|
Shareholder
|
For
|
Against
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: We believe that setting clear-cut goals will help the Company reduce its regulatory risk related
to GHG emissions, financial risk by decreasing volatility of energy prices, and overall expenditure on energy
by implementing a disciplined business strategy to cut emissions from its operations. We believe that the
proposal warrants shareholder approval. Here, we find that approval of the proposal will provide the
transparency shareholders need to evaluate such activities. After evaluating the details pursuant to the
shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this
Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
5.
|
Shareholder proposal regarding the
reporting of the Corporation's diversity,
equity and inclusion efforts.
|
Shareholder
|
For
|
Against
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: We believe that the proposal warrants shareholder approval. We believe that the proposal
would encourage good governance and enhance shareholder value by bringing together a diverse range of
skills and experience necessary in building a constructive and challenging workforce. After evaluating the
details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we
recommend a vote FOR this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
PROLOGIS, INC.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
Security
|
74340W103
|
Meeting Type
|
Annual
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Ticker Symbol
|
PLD
|
Meeting Date
|
04-May-2022
|
||||||||||||||||||||
ISIN
|
US74340W1036
|
Agenda
|
935572380 - Management
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Record Date
|
07-Mar-2022
|
Holding Recon Date
|
07-Mar-2022
|
||||||||||||||||||||
City /
|
Country
|
/
|
United
States
|
Vote Deadline
|
03-May-2022 11:59 PM ET
|
||||||||||||||||||
SEDOL(s)
|
Quick Code
|
||||||||||||||||||||||
Item
|
Proposal
|
Proposed
by
|
Vote
|
Management
Recommendation
|
For/Against
Management
|
||||||||||||||||||
1A.
|
Election of Director: Hamid R. Moghadam
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1B.
|
Election of Director: Cristina G. Bita
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1C.
|
Election of Director: George L. Fotiades
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is
considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit,
Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for
sound corporate governance practice.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1D.
|
Election of Director: Lydia H. Kennard
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1E.
|
Election of Director: Irving F. Lyons III
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1F.
|
Election of Director: Avid Modjtabai
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1G.
|
Election of Director: David P. O'Connor
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1H.
|
Election of Director: Olivier Piani
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1I.
|
Election of Director: Jeffrey L. Skelton
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is
considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit,
Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for
sound corporate governance practice.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1J.
|
Election of Director: Carl B. Webb
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is
considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit,
Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for
sound corporate governance practice.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1K.
|
Election of Director: William D. Zollars
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is
considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit,
Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for
sound corporate governance practice.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
2.
|
Advisory Vote to Approve the Company's
Executive Compensation for 2021
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
3.
|
Ratification of the Appointment of KPMG
LLP as the Company's Independent
Registered Public Accounting Firm for the
Year 2022
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor.
Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has
earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model.
After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that
shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST
this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
CLARIVATE PLC
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
Security
|
G21810109
|
Meeting Type
|
Annual
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Ticker Symbol
|
CLVT
|
Meeting Date
|
05-May-2022
|
||||||||||||||||||||
ISIN
|
JE00BJJN4441
|
Agenda
|
935609543 - Management
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Record Date
|
07-Mar-2022
|
Holding Recon Date
|
07-Mar-2022
|
||||||||||||||||||||
City /
|
Country
|
/
|
United
States
|
Vote Deadline
|
04-May-2022 11:59 PM ET
|
||||||||||||||||||
SEDOL(s)
|
Quick Code
|
||||||||||||||||||||||
Item
|
Proposal
|
Proposed
by
|
Vote
|
Management
Recommendation
|
For/Against
Management
|
||||||||||||||||||
1A.
|
Election of Director: Jerre Stead
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1B.
|
Election of Director: Valeria Alberola
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1C.
|
Election of Director: Michael Angelakis
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1D.
|
Election of Director: Jane Okun Bomba
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation
score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1E.
|
Election of Director: Usama N. Cortas
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1F.
|
Election of Director: Konstantin Gilis
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1G.
|
Election of Director: Balakrishnan S. Iyer
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1H.
|
Election of Director: Adam T. Levyn
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1I.
|
Election of Director: Anthony Munk
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1J.
|
Election of Director: Richard W. Roedel
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1K.
|
Election of Director: Andrew Snyder
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1L.
|
Election of Director: Sheryl von Blucher
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation
score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1M.
|
Election of Director: Roxane White
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation
score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
2.
|
AUTHORIZATION TO REPURCHASE
ORDINARY SHARES IN OPEN-MARKET
TRANSACTIONS.
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: We note, however, that in absence of the purpose of the proposed share repurchase, we
believe that approval of the proposal could be detrimental to the interests of the shareholders and could
unintentionally manipulate the Company's true value. As such, we recommend a vote AGAINST this
Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
3.
|
AUTHORIZATION TO REPURCHASE
ORDINARY SHARES FROM ANY
SHAREHOLDER PARTY TO THAT
CERTAIN REGISTRATION RIGHTS
AGREEMENT WITH THE COMPANY
DATED AS OF OCTOBER 1, 2020, AS
AMENDED.
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: We note, however, that in absence of the purpose of the proposed share repurchase, we
believe that approval of the proposal could be detrimental to the interests of the shareholders and could
unintentionally manipulate the Company's true value. As such, we recommend a vote AGAINST this
Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
4.
|
AUTHORIZATION TO REPURCHASE
5.25% SERIES A MANDATORY
CONVERTIBLE PREFERRED SHARES IN
OPEN-MARKET TRANSACTIONS.
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: We note, however, that in absence of the purpose of the proposed share repurchase, we
believe that approval of the proposal could be detrimental to the interests of the shareholders and could
unintentionally manipulate the Company's true value. As such, we recommend a vote AGAINST this
Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
5.
|
APPROVAL, ON AN ADVISORY, NON-
BINDING BASIS, OF THE
COMPENSATION OF OUR NAMED
EXECUTIVE OFFICERS.
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we
believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's
directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not
effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote
AGAINST this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
6.
|
RATIFICATION OF APPOINTMENT OF
INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC
ACCOUNTANTS.
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
DANAHER CORPORATION
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
Security
|
235851102
|
Meeting Type
|
Annual
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Ticker Symbol
|
DHR
|
Meeting Date
|
10-May-2022
|
||||||||||||||||||||
ISIN
|
US2358511028
|
Agenda
|
935575057 - Management
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Record Date
|
11-Mar-2022
|
Holding Recon Date
|
11-Mar-2022
|
||||||||||||||||||||
City /
|
Country
|
/
|
United
States
|
Vote Deadline
|
09-May-2022 11:59 PM ET
|
||||||||||||||||||
SEDOL(s)
|
Quick Code
|
||||||||||||||||||||||
Item
|
Proposal
|
Proposed
by
|
Vote
|
Management
Recommendation
|
For/Against
Management
|
||||||||||||||||||
1A.
|
Election of Director to hold office until the
2023 Annual Meeting of Shareholders:
Rainer M. Blair
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1B.
|
Election of Director to hold office until the
2023 Annual Meeting of Shareholders:
Linda Filler
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1C.
|
Election of Director to hold office until the
2023 Annual Meeting of Shareholders: Teri
List
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1D.
|
Election of Director to hold office until the
2023 Annual Meeting of Shareholders:
Walter G. Lohr, Jr.
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is
considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit,
Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for
sound corporate governance practice.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1E.
|
Election of Director to hold office until the
2023 Annual Meeting of Shareholders:
Jessica L. Mega, MD, MPH
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1F.
|
Election of Director to hold office until the
2023 Annual Meeting of Shareholders:
Mitchell P. Rales
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1G.
|
Election of Director to hold office until the
2023 Annual Meeting of Shareholders:
Steven M. Rales
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1H.
|
Election of Director to hold office until the
2023 Annual Meeting of Shareholders:
Pardis C. Sabeti, MD, D. PHIL
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1I.
|
Election of Director to hold office until the
2023 Annual Meeting of Shareholders: A.
Shane Sanders
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1J.
|
Election of Director to hold office until the
2023 Annual Meeting of Shareholders: John
T. Schwieters
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is
considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit,
Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for
sound corporate governance practice.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1K.
|
Election of Director to hold office until the
2023 Annual Meeting of Shareholders: Alan
G. Spoon
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is
considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit,
Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for
sound corporate governance practice.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1L.
|
Election of Director to hold office until the
2023 Annual Meeting of Shareholders:
Raymond C. Stevens, Ph.D
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1M.
|
Election of Director to hold office until the
2023 Annual Meeting of Shareholders: Elias
A. Zerhouni, MD
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
2.
|
To ratify the selection of Ernst & Young LLP
as Danaher's independent registered public
accounting firm for the year ending
December 31, 2022.
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor.
Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has
earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model.
After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that
shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST
this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
3.
|
To approve on an advisory basis the
Company's named executive officer
compensation.
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
4.
|
To act upon a shareholder proposal
requesting that Danaher amend its
governing documents to reduce the
percentage of shares required for
shareholders to call a special meeting of
shareholders from 25% to 10%.
|
Shareholder
|
For
|
Against
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: We believe that this proposal is consistent with best corporate governance practices and in the
best interests of the shareholders to permit holders of 10% or more of the Company's outstanding shares of
common stock to call special meetings of shareholders. After evaluating the details pursuant to the
shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote
FOR this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
INTERCONTINENTAL EXCHANGE, INC.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
Security
|
45866F104
|
Meeting Type
|
Annual
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Ticker Symbol
|
ICE
|
Meeting Date
|
13-May-2022
|
||||||||||||||||||||
ISIN
|
US45866F1049
|
Agenda
|
935583408 - Management
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Record Date
|
15-Mar-2022
|
Holding Recon Date
|
15-Mar-2022
|
||||||||||||||||||||
City /
|
Country
|
/
|
United
States
|
Vote Deadline
|
12-May-2022 11:59 PM ET
|
||||||||||||||||||
SEDOL(s)
|
Quick Code
|
||||||||||||||||||||||
Item
|
Proposal
|
Proposed
by
|
Vote
|
Management
Recommendation
|
For/Against
Management
|
||||||||||||||||||
1A.
|
Election of Director for term expiring in
2023: Hon. Sharon Y. Bowen
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1B.
|
Election of Director for term expiring in
2023: Shantella E. Cooper
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1C.
|
Election of Director for term expiring in
2023: Duriya M. Farooqui
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1D.
|
Election of Director for term expiring in
2023: The Rt. Hon. the Lord Hague of
Richmond
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F20 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company's SOP Fails Egan-Jones
Dilution Model
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for
such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly
as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any
similar plan that may be proposed in the future.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1E.
|
Election of Director for term expiring in
2023: Mark F. Mulhern
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F20 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company's SOP Fails Egan-Jones
Dilution Model
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for
such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly
as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any
similar plan that may be proposed in the future.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1F.
|
Election of Director for term expiring in
2023: Thomas E. Noonan
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1G.
|
Election of Director for term expiring in
2023: Caroline L. Silver
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1H.
|
Election of Director for term expiring in
2023: Jeffrey C. Sprecher
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1I.
|
Election of Director for term expiring in
2023: Judith A. Sprieser
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1J.
|
Election of Director for term expiring in
2023: Martha A. Tirinnanzi
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
2.
|
To approve, by non-binding vote, the
advisory resolution on executive
compensation for named executive officers.
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
3.
|
To approve the Intercontinental Exchange,
Inc. 2022 Omnibus Employee Incentive
Plan.
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: After taking into account the maximum amount of shareholder equity dilution this proposal could
cause, as well as both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that
shareholders should not support the passage of this plan as proposed by the board of directors. We
recommend the board seek to align CEO pay more closely with the performance of the company and work
to reduce the cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. Therefore, we recommend a vote
AGAINST this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
4.
|
To approve the Intercontinental Exchange,
Inc. 2022 Omnibus Non-Employee Director
Incentive Plan.
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
5.
|
To approve the adoption of amendments to
our current Certificate of Incorporation to
eliminate supermajority voting provisions.
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
6.
|
To approve the adoption of amendments to
our current Certificate of Incorporation to
lower the special meeting ownership
threshold to 20%.
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: We believe that this proposal is consistent with best corporate governance practices and in the
best interests of the shareholders to permit holders of at least 10% or more of the Company's outstanding
shares of common stock to call special meetings of shareholders. We recommend a vote AGAINST this
Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
7.
|
To ratify the appointment of Ernst & Young
LLP as our independent registered public
accounting firm for the fiscal year ending
December 31, 2022.
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor.
Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has
earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model.
After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that
shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST
this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
8.
|
A stockholder proposal regarding special
stockholder meeting improvement, if
properly presented at the Annual Meeting.
|
Shareholder
|
For
|
Against
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: We believe that this proposal is consistent with best corporate governance practices and in the
best interests of the shareholders to permit holders of at least 10% or more of the Company's outstanding
shares of common stock to call special meetings of shareholders. After evaluating the details pursuant to
the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote
FOR this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
JPMORGAN CHASE & CO.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
Security
|
46625H100
|
Meeting Type
|
Annual
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Ticker Symbol
|
JPM
|
Meeting Date
|
17-May-2022
|
||||||||||||||||||||
ISIN
|
US46625H1005
|
Agenda
|
935580515 - Management
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Record Date
|
18-Mar-2022
|
Holding Recon Date
|
18-Mar-2022
|
||||||||||||||||||||
City /
|
Country
|
/
|
United
States
|
Vote Deadline
|
16-May-2022 11:59 PM ET
|
||||||||||||||||||
SEDOL(s)
|
Quick Code
|
||||||||||||||||||||||
Item
|
Proposal
|
Proposed
by
|
Vote
|
Management
Recommendation
|
For/Against
Management
|
||||||||||||||||||
1a.
|
Election of Director: Linda B. Bammann
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation
score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1b.
|
Election of Director: Stephen B. Burke
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is
considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit,
Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for
sound corporate governance practice.
F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some
Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1c.
|
Election of Director: Todd A. Combs
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation
score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1d.
|
Election of Director: James S. Crown
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1e.
|
Election of Director: James Dimon
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F21 Combined CEO and Board Chair Positions and the Company Earns a Board Score of
Some Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that there is an inherent potential conflict, in having the CEO or former
CEO serve as the Chairman of the Board. Consequently, we prefer that companies focus on the following
areas to improve its corporate governance practices: separate the roles of the Chairman and CEO, hold
annual director elections, have one class of voting stock only, have key board committees consisting of
independent directors and majority of independent directors on board and include non-binding
compensation vote on agenda to further ensure board independence and accountability.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1f.
|
Election of Director: Timothy P. Flynn
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is
considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit,
Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for
sound corporate governance practice.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1g.
|
Election of Director: Mellody Hobson
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1h.
|
Election of Director: Michael A. Neal
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1i.
|
Election of Director: Phebe N. Novakovic
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1j.
|
Election of Director: Virginia M. Rometty
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation
score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
2.
|
Advisory resolution to approve executive
compensation
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we
believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's
directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not
effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote
AGAINST this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
3.
|
Ratification of independent registered public
accounting firm
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor.
Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has
earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model.
After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that
shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST
this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
4.
|
Fossil fuel financing
|
Shareholder
|
Against
|
Against
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
5.
|
Special shareholder meeting improvement
|
Shareholder
|
For
|
Against
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: We believe that this proposal is consistent with best corporate governance practices and in the
best interests of the shareholders to permit holders of at least 10% or more of the Company's outstanding
shares of common stock to call special meetings of shareholders. After evaluating the details pursuant to
the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote
FOR this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
6.
|
Independent board chairman
|
Shareholder
|
For
|
Against
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: We believe that there is an inherent potential conflict, in having an Inside director serve as the
Chairman of the board. Consequently, we prefer that companies separate the roles of the Chairman and
CEO and that the Chairman be independent to further ensure board independence and accountability. After
evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy
Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
7.
|
Board diversity resolution
|
Shareholder
|
For
|
Against
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: We believe that the proposal warrants shareholder approval. We believe that the proposal
would encourage good governance and enhance shareholder value by bringing together a diverse range of
skills and experience necessary in building a constructive and challenging board. After evaluating the
details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we
recommend a vote FOR this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
8.
|
Conversion to public benefit corporation
|
Shareholder
|
Against
|
Against
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
9.
|
Report on setting absolute contraction
targets
|
Shareholder
|
For
|
Against
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: We believe that setting clear-cut goals will help the Company reduce its regulatory risk related
to GHG emissions, financial risk by decreasing volatility of energy prices, and overall expenditure on energy
by implementing a disciplined business strategy to cut emissions from its operations. After evaluating the
details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we
recommend a vote FOR this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
THERMO FISHER SCIENTIFIC INC.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
Security
|
883556102
|
Meeting Type
|
Annual
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Ticker Symbol
|
TMO
|
Meeting Date
|
18-May-2022
|
||||||||||||||||||||
ISIN
|
US8835561023
|
Agenda
|
935585058 - Management
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Record Date
|
25-Mar-2022
|
Holding Recon Date
|
25-Mar-2022
|
||||||||||||||||||||
City /
|
Country
|
/
|
United
States
|
Vote Deadline
|
17-May-2022 11:59 PM ET
|
||||||||||||||||||
SEDOL(s)
|
Quick Code
|
||||||||||||||||||||||
Item
|
Proposal
|
Proposed
by
|
Vote
|
Management
Recommendation
|
For/Against
Management
|
||||||||||||||||||
1A.
|
Election of director: Marc N. Casper
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1B.
|
Election of director: Nelson J. Chai
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1C.
|
Election of director: Ruby R. Chandy
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1D.
|
Election of director: C. Martin Harris
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1E.
|
Election of director: Tyler Jacks
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1F.
|
Election of director: R. Alexandra Keith
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1G.
|
Election of director: Jim P. Manzi
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is
considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit,
Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for
sound corporate governance practice.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1H.
|
Election of director: James C. Mullen
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1I.
|
Election of director: Lars R. Sorensen
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1J.
|
Election of director: Debora L. Spar
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1K.
|
Election of director: Scott M. Sperling
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is
considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit,
Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for
sound corporate governance practice.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1L.
|
Election of director: Dion J. Weisler
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
2.
|
An advisory vote to approve named
executive officer compensation.
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
3.
|
Ratification of the Audit Committee's
selection of PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP
as the Company's independent auditors for
2022.
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor.
Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has
earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model.
After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that
shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST
this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
MONDELEZ INTERNATIONAL, INC.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
Security
|
609207105
|
Meeting Type
|
Annual
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Ticker Symbol
|
MDLZ
|
Meeting Date
|
18-May-2022
|
||||||||||||||||||||
ISIN
|
US6092071058
|
Agenda
|
935587379 - Management
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Record Date
|
14-Mar-2022
|
Holding Recon Date
|
14-Mar-2022
|
||||||||||||||||||||
City /
|
Country
|
/
|
United
States
|
Vote Deadline
|
17-May-2022 11:59 PM ET
|
||||||||||||||||||
SEDOL(s)
|
Quick Code
|
||||||||||||||||||||||
Item
|
Proposal
|
Proposed
by
|
Vote
|
Management
Recommendation
|
For/Against
Management
|
||||||||||||||||||
1A.
|
Election of Director: Lewis W.K. Booth
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is
considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit,
Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for
sound corporate governance practice.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1B.
|
Election of Director: Charles E. Bunch
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1C.
|
Election of Director: Ertharin Cousin
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1D.
|
Election of Director: Lois D. Juliber
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1E.
|
Election of Director: Jorge S. Mesquita
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is
considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit,
Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for
sound corporate governance practice.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1F.
|
Election of Director: Jane Hamilton Nielsen
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1G.
|
Election of Director: Christiana S. Shi
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1H.
|
Election of Director: Patrick T. Siewert
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is
considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit,
Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for
sound corporate governance practice.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1I.
|
Election of Director: Michael A. Todman
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1J.
|
Election of Director: Dirk Van de Put
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F21 Combined CEO and Board Chair Positions and the Company Earns a Board Score of
Some Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that there is an inherent potential conflict, in having the CEO or former
CEO serve as the Chairman of the Board. Consequently, we prefer that companies focus on the following
areas to improve its corporate governance practices: separate the roles of the Chairman and CEO, hold
annual director elections, have one class of voting stock only, have key board committees consisting of
independent directors and majority of independent directors on board and include non-binding
compensation vote on agenda to further ensure board independence and accountability.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
2.
|
Advisory Vote to Approve Executive
Compensation.
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
3.
|
Ratification of PricewaterhouseCoopers
LLP as Independent Registered Public
Accountants for Fiscal Year Ending
December 31, 2022.
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor.
Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has
earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model.
After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that
shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST
this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
4.
|
Conduct and Publish Racial Equity Audit.
|
Shareholder
|
For
|
Against
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: We believe that the proposal warrants shareholder approval. After evaluating the details
pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we
recommend a vote FOR this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
5.
|
Require Independent Chair of the Board.
|
Shareholder
|
For
|
Against
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: We believe that there is an inherent potential conflict, in having an Inside director serve as the
Chairman of the board. Consequently, we prefer that companies separate the roles of the Chairman and
CEO and that the Chairman be independent to further ensure board independence and accountability. After
evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy
Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
FISERV, INC.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
Security
|
337738108
|
Meeting Type
|
Annual
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Ticker Symbol
|
FISV
|
Meeting Date
|
18-May-2022
|
||||||||||||||||||||
ISIN
|
US3377381088
|
Agenda
|
935593788 - Management
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Record Date
|
21-Mar-2022
|
Holding Recon Date
|
21-Mar-2022
|
||||||||||||||||||||
City /
|
Country
|
/
|
United
States
|
Vote Deadline
|
17-May-2022 11:59 PM ET
|
||||||||||||||||||
SEDOL(s)
|
Quick Code
|
||||||||||||||||||||||
Item
|
Proposal
|
Proposed
by
|
Vote
|
Management
Recommendation
|
For/Against
Management
|
||||||||||||||||||
1.
|
DIRECTOR
|
Management
|
|||||||||||||||||||||
1
|
Frank J. Bisignano
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
|||||||||||||||||||
2
|
Alison Davis
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
|||||||||||||||||||
3
|
Henrique de Castro
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
|||||||||||||||||||
4
|
Harry F. DiSimone
|
Withheld
|
For
|
Against
|
|||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation
score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
5
|
Dylan G. Haggart
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
|||||||||||||||||||
6
|
Wafaa Mamilli
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
|||||||||||||||||||
7
|
Heidi G. Miller
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
|||||||||||||||||||
8
|
Doyle R. Simons
|
Withheld
|
For
|
Against
|
|||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is
considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit,
Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for
sound corporate governance practice.
F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some
Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
9
|
Kevin M. Warren
|
Withheld
|
For
|
Against
|
|||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation
score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
2.
|
To approve, on an advisory basis, the
compensation of the named executive
officers of Fiserv, Inc.
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we
believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's
directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not
effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote
AGAINST this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
3.
|
To ratify the appointment of Deloitte &
Touche LLP as the independent registered
public accounting firm of Fiserv, Inc. for
2022.
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor.
Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has
earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model.
After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that
shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST
this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
4.
|
Shareholder proposal requesting the board
seek shareholder approval of senior
manager severance and termination
payments.
|
Shareholder
|
For
|
Against
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: We believe that the Company's compensation practices have been and will continue to be a
key factor in the ability to deliver strong results. Furthermore, we believe that adopting the this proposal
would put the Company at a competitive advantage in recruiting and retaining executive talent and that it is
in the best interests of the Company and its stockholders for the independent Compensation Committee to
retain the flexibility to design and administer competitive compensation program. After evaluating the details
pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we
recommend a vote FOR this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
MOLSON COORS BEVERAGE COMPANY
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
Security
|
60871R209
|
Meeting Type
|
Annual
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Ticker Symbol
|
TAP
|
Meeting Date
|
18-May-2022
|
||||||||||||||||||||
ISIN
|
US60871R2094
|
Agenda
|
935598031 - Management
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Record Date
|
25-Mar-2022
|
Holding Recon Date
|
25-Mar-2022
|
||||||||||||||||||||
City /
|
Country
|
/
|
United
States
|
Vote Deadline
|
17-May-2022 11:59 PM ET
|
||||||||||||||||||
SEDOL(s)
|
Quick Code
|
||||||||||||||||||||||
Item
|
Proposal
|
Proposed
by
|
Vote
|
Management
Recommendation
|
For/Against
Management
|
||||||||||||||||||
1.
|
DIRECTOR
|
Management
|
|||||||||||||||||||||
1
|
Roger G. Eaton
|
Withheld
|
For
|
Against
|
|||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is
considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit,
Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for
sound corporate governance practice.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
2
|
Charles M. Herington
|
Withheld
|
For
|
Against
|
|||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is
considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit,
Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for
sound corporate governance practice.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
3
|
H. Sanford Riley
|
Withheld
|
For
|
Against
|
|||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is
considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit,
Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for
sound corporate governance practice.
F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some
Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
2.
|
To approve, on an advisory basis, the
compensation of Molson Coors Beverage
Company's named executive officers.
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we
believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's
directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not
effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote
AGAINST this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
US FOODS HOLDING CORP.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
Security
|
912008109
|
Meeting Type
|
Contested-Annual
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Ticker Symbol
|
USFD
|
Meeting Date
|
18-May-2022
|
||||||||||||||||||||
ISIN
|
US9120081099
|
Agenda
|
935611485 - Management
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Record Date
|
21-Mar-2022
|
Holding Recon Date
|
21-Mar-2022
|
||||||||||||||||||||
City /
|
Country
|
/
|
United
States
|
Vote Deadline
|
17-May-2022 11:59 PM ET
|
||||||||||||||||||
SEDOL(s)
|
Quick Code
|
||||||||||||||||||||||
Item
|
Proposal
|
Proposed
by
|
Vote
|
Management
Recommendation
|
For/Against
Management
|
||||||||||||||||||
1.
|
DIRECTOR
|
Management
|
|||||||||||||||||||||
1
|
Cheryl A. Bachelder
|
Withheld
|
For
|
Against
|
|||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation
score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
2
|
Court D. Carruthers
|
Withheld
|
For
|
Against
|
|||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation
score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
3
|
Robert M. Dutkowsky
|
Withheld
|
For
|
Against
|
|||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F3 Over-Boarded (Board Chair)
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Chairman, being responsible for the leadership of the Board
and the creation of the conditions necessary for overall board and individual director effectiveness, should
hold no more than one other public directorship to ensure the valuable and prudent exercise of his/her
fiduciary duties as a Chairman and that his/her integrity and efficiency are not compromised.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
4
|
Marla Gottschalk
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
|||||||||||||||||||
5
|
Sunil Gupta
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
|||||||||||||||||||
6
|
Carl Andrew Pforzheimer
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
|||||||||||||||||||
7
|
Quentin Roach
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
|||||||||||||||||||
8
|
Pietro Satriano
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
|||||||||||||||||||
9
|
David M. Tehle
|
Withheld
|
For
|
Against
|
|||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation
score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
10
|
Ann E. Ziegler
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
|||||||||||||||||||
2.
|
Approval, on an advisory basis, of the
compensation paid to our named executive
officers
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we
believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's
directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not
effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote
AGAINST this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
3.
|
Ratification of the appointment of Deloitte &
Touche LLP as our independent registered
public accounting firm for fiscal 2022
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor.
Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has
earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model.
After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that
shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST
this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
4.
|
Consideration of a shareholder proposal, if
properly presented at the Annual Meeting
|
Shareholder
|
For
|
None
|
|||||||||||||||||||
Comments: We believe that setting clear-cut goals will help the Company reduce its regulatory risk related
to GHG emissions, financial risk by decreasing volatility of energy prices, and overall expenditure on energy
by implementing a disciplined business strategy to cut emissions from its operations. After evaluating the
details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we
recommend a vote FOR this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
US FOODS HOLDING CORP.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
Security
|
912008109
|
Meeting Type
|
Contested-Annual
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Ticker Symbol
|
USFD
|
Meeting Date
|
18-May-2022
|
||||||||||||||||||||
ISIN
|
US9120081099
|
Agenda
|
935614962 - Opposition
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Record Date
|
21-Mar-2022
|
Holding Recon Date
|
21-Mar-2022
|
||||||||||||||||||||
City /
|
Country
|
/
|
United
States
|
Vote Deadline
|
17-May-2022 11:59 PM ET
|
||||||||||||||||||
SEDOL(s)
|
Quick Code
|
||||||||||||||||||||||
Item
|
Proposal
|
Proposed
by
|
Vote
|
Management
Recommendation
|
For/Against
Management
|
||||||||||||||||||
1.
|
DIRECTOR
|
Management
|
|||||||||||||||||||||
1
|
James J. Barber, Jr
|
For
|
|||||||||||||||||||||
2
|
Scott D. Ferguson
|
For
|
|||||||||||||||||||||
3
|
Jeri B. Finard
|
For
|
|||||||||||||||||||||
4
|
John J. Harris
|
For
|
|||||||||||||||||||||
5
|
David A. Toy
|
For
|
|||||||||||||||||||||
6
|
MGT NOM: R M Dutkowsky
|
For
|
|||||||||||||||||||||
7
|
MGT NOM: M. Gottschalk
|
For
|
|||||||||||||||||||||
8
|
MGT NOM: Quentin Roach
|
For
|
|||||||||||||||||||||
9
|
MGT NOM: P. Satriano
|
For
|
|||||||||||||||||||||
10
|
MGT NOM: Ann E Ziegler
|
For
|
|||||||||||||||||||||
2.
|
Company's proposal to approve, on an
advisory basis, the compensation paid to
the Company's named executive officers,
as disclosed in the Company's proxy
statement.
|
Management
|
None
|
||||||||||||||||||||
3.
|
Company's proposal to ratify the
appointment of Deloitte & Touche LLP as
the Company's independent registered
public accounting firm for fiscal 2022.
|
Management
|
None
|
||||||||||||||||||||
4.
|
Stockholder proposal concerning the
Company's greenhouse gas emissions.
|
Shareholder
|
None
|
||||||||||||||||||||
CHUBB LIMITED
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
Security
|
H1467J104
|
Meeting Type
|
Annual
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Ticker Symbol
|
CB
|
Meeting Date
|
19-May-2022
|
||||||||||||||||||||
ISIN
|
CH0044328745
|
Agenda
|
935586101 - Management
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Record Date
|
25-Mar-2022
|
Holding Recon Date
|
25-Mar-2022
|
||||||||||||||||||||
City /
|
Country
|
/
|
United
States
|
Vote Deadline
|
17-May-2022 11:59 PM ET
|
||||||||||||||||||
SEDOL(s)
|
Quick Code
|
||||||||||||||||||||||
Item
|
Proposal
|
Proposed
by
|
Vote
|
Management
Recommendation
|
For/Against
Management
|
||||||||||||||||||
1
|
Approval of the management report,
standalone financial statements and
consolidated financial statements of Chubb
Limited for the year ended December 31,
2021
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
2A
|
Allocation of disposable profit
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
2B
|
Distribution of a dividend out of legal
reserves (by way of release and allocation
to a dividend reserve)
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
3
|
Discharge of the Board of Directors
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
4A
|
Election of PricewaterhouseCoopers AG
(Zurich) as our statutory auditor
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor.
Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has
earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model.
After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that
shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST
this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
4B
|
Ratification of appointment of
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP (United
States) as independent registered public
accounting firm for purposes of U.S.
securities law reporting
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor.
Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has
earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model.
After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that
shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST
this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
4C
|
Election of BDO AG (Zurich) as special
audit firm
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
5A
|
Election of Director: Evan G. Greenberg
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: Combined CEO and Board Chair positions and the Company earns a board score of Some
Concerns
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that there is an inherent potential conflict, in having the CEO or former
CEO serve as the Chairman of the Board. Consequently, we prefer that companies focus on the following
areas to improve its corporate governance practices: separate the roles of the Chairman and CEO, hold
annual director elections, have one class of voting stock only, have key board committees consisting of
independent directors and majority of independent directors on board and include non-binding
compensation vote on agenda to further ensure board independence and accountability.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
5B
|
Election of Director: Michael P. Connors
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: Affiliated Outside director serving as a member of the Compensation and Nominating
Committees
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is
considered affiliated, with the exception of diverse nominees.
We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be
comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
5C
|
Election of Director: Michael G. Atieh
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
5D
|
Election of Director: Kathy Bonanno
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
5E
|
Election of Director: Sheila P. Burke
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
5F
|
Election of Director: Mary Cirillo
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
5G
|
Election of Director: Robert J. Hugin
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
5H
|
Election of Director: Robert W. Scully
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
5I
|
Election of Director: Theodore E. Shasta
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: Affiliated Outside director serving as a member of the Audit Committee
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is
considered affiliated, with the exception of diverse nominees.
We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be
comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
5J
|
Election of Director: David H. Sidwell
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
5K
|
Election of Director: Olivier Steimer
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
5L
|
Election of Director: Luis Téllez
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
5M
|
Election of Director: Frances F. Townsend
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
6
|
Election of Evan G. Greenberg as
Chairman of the Board of Directors
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: Combined CEO and Board Chair positions and the Company earns a board score of Some
Concerns
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that there is an inherent potential conflict, in having the CEO or former
CEO serve as the Chairman of the Board. Consequently, we prefer that companies focus on the following
areas to improve its corporate governance practices: separate the roles of the Chairman and CEO, hold
annual director elections, have one class of voting stock only, have key board committees consisting of
independent directors and majority of independent directors on board and include non-binding
compensation vote on agenda to further ensure board independence and accountability
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
7A
|
Election of Director of the Compensation
Committee: Michael P. Connors
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: Affiliated Outside director serving as a member of the Compensation and Nominating
Committees
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is
considered affiliated, with the exception of diverse nominees.
We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be
comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
7B
|
Election of Director of the Compensation
Committee: Mary Cirillo
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
7C
|
Election of Director of the Compensation
Committee: Frances F. Townsend
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
8
|
Election of Homburger AG as independent
proxy
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
9
|
Amendment to the Articles of Association
relating to authorized share capital for
general purposes
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
10
|
Reduction of share capital
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
11A
|
Compensation of the Board of Directors
until the next annual general meeting
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
11B
|
Compensation of Executive Management
for the next calendar year
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
12
|
Advisory vote to approve executive
compensation under U.S. securities law
requirements
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
13
|
Shareholder proposal regarding a policy
restricting underwriting of new fossil fuel
supplies
|
Shareholder
|
Against
|
Against
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: We do not believe that the expenditure of the additional human and financial resources that
would be required to adopt this proposal would be a necessary or prudent use of Company and shareholder
assets. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-
Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
14
|
Shareholder proposal regarding a report on
greenhouse gas emissions
|
Shareholder
|
For
|
Against
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: Acknowledging climate change as an inevitable factor, and recognizing the need to adapt,
involves bold decisions by business. Therefore, we believe that companies should review how climate
change impacts the economy and portfolio companies and evaluate how shareholder resolutions on climate
change may impact long-term shareholder value as it votes proxies. After evaluating the details pursuant to
the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote
FOR this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
A
|
If a new agenda item or a new proposal for
an existing agenda item is put before the
meeting, I/we hereby authorize and instruct
the independent proxy to vote as follows.
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: We do not recommend that shareholders approve in advance matters of which they have no
knowledge. Accordingly, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
COMCAST CORPORATION
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
Security
|
20030N101
|
Meeting Type
|
Annual
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Ticker Symbol
|
CMCSA
|
Meeting Date
|
01-Jun-2022
|
||||||||||||||||||||
ISIN
|
US20030N1019
|
Agenda
|
935613693 - Management
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Record Date
|
04-Apr-2022
|
Holding Recon Date
|
04-Apr-2022
|
||||||||||||||||||||
City /
|
Country
|
/
|
United
States
|
Vote Deadline
|
31-May-2022 11:59 PM ET
|
||||||||||||||||||
SEDOL(s)
|
Quick Code
|
||||||||||||||||||||||
Item
|
Proposal
|
Proposed
by
|
Vote
|
Management
Recommendation
|
For/Against
Management
|
||||||||||||||||||
1.
|
DIRECTOR
|
Management
|
|||||||||||||||||||||
1
|
Kenneth J. Bacon
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
|||||||||||||||||||
2
|
Madeline S. Bell
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
|||||||||||||||||||
3
|
Edward D. Breen
|
Withheld
|
For
|
Against
|
|||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation
score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
4
|
Gerald L. Hassell
|
Withheld
|
For
|
Against
|
|||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is
considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit,
Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for
sound corporate governance practice.
F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some
Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
5
|
Jeffrey A. Honickman
|
Withheld
|
For
|
Against
|
|||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is
considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit,
Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for
sound corporate governance practice.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
6
|
Maritza G. Montiel
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
|||||||||||||||||||
7
|
Asuka Nakahara
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
|||||||||||||||||||
8
|
David C. Novak
|
Withheld
|
For
|
Against
|
|||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation
score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
9
|
Brian L. Roberts
|
Withheld
|
For
|
Against
|
|||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F21 Combined CEO and Board Chair Positions and the Company Earns a Board Score of
Some Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that there is an inherent potential conflict, in having the CEO or former
CEO serve as the Chairman of the Board. Consequently, we prefer that companies focus on the following
areas to improve its corporate governance practices: separate the roles of the Chairman and CEO, hold
annual director elections, have one class of voting stock only, have key board committees consisting of
independent directors and majority of independent directors on board and include non-binding
compensation vote on agenda to further ensure board independence and accountability.
F22 Chairman of the Board and the Company Earns a Cyber Security Risk Score of Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Chairman of the Board should be held accountable in cases
when the Company obtains the score of Needs Attention on the Cyber Security Risk Score. We believe that
cyber security should be critical for all organizations given the rise of the cyber threats and data breaches in
the corporate scene, which could affect any organization's reputation and lead to declined investor
confidence. As such, Egan-Jones believes that in order to avoid risks of data breaches any cybersecurity
weaknesses should be addressed aggressively in the board room, combined with the proper approach to
cyber risk management, implementation of systems and controls against cybersecurity incidents and the
leadership of the Chairman of the Board.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
2.
|
Advisory vote on executive compensation
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we
believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's
directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not
effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote
AGAINST this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
3.
|
Ratification of the appointment of our
independent auditors
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor.
Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has
earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model.
After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that
shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST
this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
4.
|
To report on charitable donations
|
Shareholder
|
Against
|
Against
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: In light of the Company's policies and oversight mechanisms related to its charitable
contributions and activities, we believe that the shareholder proposal is unnecessary and will not result in
any additional benefit to the shareholders. Rather, the proposal promotes impractical and imprudent actions
that would negatively affect the business and results. After evaluating the details pursuant to the
shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote
AGAINST this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
5.
|
To perform independent racial equity audit
|
Shareholder
|
For
|
Against
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: We believe that a company's success depends upon its ability to embrace diversity. As such,
we believe that adoption of this proposal is in the best interests of the Company and its shareholders. As
such, in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
6.
|
To report on risks of omitting "viewpoint"
and "ideology" from EEO policy
|
Shareholder
|
For
|
Against
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: We believe that approval of the proposal will enable the Company to avoid legal and
reputational risk arising from harassment and discrimination. After evaluating the details pursuant to the
shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote
FOR this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
7.
|
To conduct and publicly release the results
of an independent investigation into the
effectiveness of sexual harassment policies
|
Shareholder
|
For
|
Against
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: We believe that approval of the proposal will enable the Company to avoid legal and
reputational risk arising from harassment and discrimination. After evaluating the details pursuant to the
shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote
FOR this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
8.
|
To report on how retirement plan options
align with company climate goals
|
Shareholder
|
For
|
Against
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: After evaluating the provisions and tenets of the proposal, we determined that the proposed
resolution contemplated thereby is advisable, substantively and procedurally fair to, and in the best interests
of Company and its shareholders. We recommend a vote FOR this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
ALPHABET INC.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
Security
|
02079K305
|
Meeting Type
|
Annual
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Ticker Symbol
|
GOOGL
|
Meeting Date
|
01-Jun-2022
|
||||||||||||||||||||
ISIN
|
US02079K3059
|
Agenda
|
935618578 - Management
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Record Date
|
05-Apr-2022
|
Holding Recon Date
|
05-Apr-2022
|
||||||||||||||||||||
City /
|
Country
|
/
|
United
States
|
Vote Deadline
|
31-May-2022 11:59 PM ET
|
||||||||||||||||||
SEDOL(s)
|
Quick Code
|
||||||||||||||||||||||
Item
|
Proposal
|
Proposed
by
|
Vote
|
Management
Recommendation
|
For/Against
Management
|
||||||||||||||||||
1a.
|
Election of Director: Larry Page
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1b.
|
Election of Director: Sergey Brin
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1c.
|
Election of Director: Sundar Pichai
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1d.
|
Election of Director: John L. Hennessy
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is
considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit,
Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for
sound corporate governance practice.
F22 Chairman of the Board and the Company Earns a Cyber Security Risk Score of Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Chairman of the Board should be held accountable in cases
when the Company obtains the score of Needs Attention on the Cyber Security Risk Score. We believe that
cyber security should be critical for all organizations given the rise of the cyber threats and data breaches in
the corporate scene, which could affect any organization's reputation and lead to declined investor
confidence. As such, Egan-Jones believes that in order to avoid risks of data breaches any cybersecurity
weaknesses should be addressed aggressively in the board room, combined with the proper approach to
cyber risk management, implementation of systems and controls against cybersecurity incidents and the
leadership of the Chairman of the Board.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1e.
|
Election of Director: Frances H. Arnold
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1f.
|
Election of Director: L. John Doerr
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is
considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit,
Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for
sound corporate governance practice.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
F20 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company's SOP Fails Egan-Jones Dilution
Model
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for
such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly
as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any
similar plan that may be proposed in the future.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1g.
|
Election of Director: Roger W. Ferguson Jr.
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1h.
|
Election of Director: Ann Mather
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1i.
|
Election of Director: K. Ram Shriram
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F20 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company's SOP Fails Egan-Jones
Dilution Model
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for
such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly
as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any
similar plan that may be proposed in the future.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1j.
|
Election of Director: Robin L. Washington
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F20 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company's SOP Fails Egan-Jones
Dilution Model
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for
such disapproval and that the board as a whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly
as well as link that pay with the performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any
similar plan that may be proposed in the future.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
2.
|
Ratification of the appointment of Ernst &
Young LLP as Alphabet's independent
registered public accounting firm for the
fiscal year ending December 31, 2022.
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor.
Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has
earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model.
After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that
shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST
this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
3.
|
The amendment of Alphabet's 2021 Stock
Plan to increase the share reserve by
4,000,000 shares of Class C capital stock.
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: After taking into account the maximum amount of shareholder equity dilution this proposal could
cause, as well as both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that
shareholders should not support the passage of this plan as proposed by the board of directors. We
recommend the board seek to align CEO pay more closely with the performance of the company and work
to reduce the cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. Therefore, we recommend a vote
AGAINST this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
4.
|
The amendment of Alphabet's Amended
and Restated Certificate of Incorporation to
increase the number of authorized shares.
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
5.
|
A stockholder proposal regarding a lobbying
report, if properly presented at the meeting.
|
Shareholder
|
Against
|
Against
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: We believe that it is in the best interests of the Company and the stockholders to belong to
industry associations and coalitions, where the Company benefits from the general business, technical, and
industry standard-setting expertise these organizations provide. We furthermore believe that the proposal
seeks unnecessary line-item disclosure of lobbying expenditures. We believe that the requested report is
unnecessary and would require expenditures and the use of Company resources without providing any
meaningful benefit to the shareholders. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal
and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
6.
|
A stockholder proposal regarding a climate
lobbying report, if properly presented at the
meeting.
|
Shareholder
|
Against
|
Against
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: We believe that it is in the best interests of the Company and the stockholders to belong to
industry associations and coalitions, where the Company benefits from the general business, technical, and
industry standard-setting expertise these organizations provide. We furthermore believe that the proposal
seeks unnecessary line-item disclosure of lobbying expenditures. We believe that the requested report is
unnecessary and would require expenditures and the use of Company resources without providing any
meaningful benefit to the shareholders. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal
and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
7.
|
A stockholder proposal regarding a report
on physical risks of climate change, if
properly presented at the meeting.
|
Shareholder
|
For
|
Against
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: We believe that transparency is important for evaluating risks and ensuring that investors and
stakeholders have adequate information necessary to make informed decisions. After evaluating the details
pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we
recommend a vote FOR this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
8.
|
A stockholder proposal regarding a report
on water management risks, if properly
presented at the meeting.
|
Shareholder
|
For
|
Against
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: We believe that transparency is important for evaluating risks and ensuring that investors and
stakeholders have adequate information necessary to make informed decisions. After evaluating the details
pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we
recommend a vote FOR this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
9.
|
A stockholder proposal regarding a racial
equity audit, if properly presented at the
meeting.
|
Shareholder
|
For
|
Against
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: We believe that a company's success depends upon its ability to embrace diversity. As such,
we believe that adoption of this proposal is in the best interests of the Company and its shareholders. As
such, in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
10.
|
A stockholder proposal regarding a report
on concealment clauses, if properly
presented at the meeting.
|
Shareholder
|
For
|
Against
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: We believe that the proposal warrants shareholder approval. Here, we find that approval of the
proposal will provide the transparency shareholders need to evaluate such activities. After evaluating the
details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Guidelines, we
recommend a vote FOR this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
11.
|
A stockholder proposal regarding equal
shareholder voting, if properly presented at
the meeting.
|
Shareholder
|
For
|
Against
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: We believe that shareholder approval is warranted. We oppose such differential voting power
as it may have the effect of denying shareholders the opportunity to vote on matters of critical economic
importance to them. We prefer that companies do not utilize multiple class capital structures to provide
equal voting rights to all shareholders. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and
in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
12.
|
A stockholder proposal regarding a report
on government takedown requests, if
properly presented at the meeting.
|
Shareholder
|
For
|
Against
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: We believe that improved transparency and accountability is needed to meet the company's
long-term responsibility to its many investors. We believe that the preparation of the report will allow the
Company to evaluate its activities related to political advertising and potential censorship issues, and at the
same time assess the operational, reputational, and social implications of such to the Company. After
evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones'
Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
13.
|
A stockholder proposal regarding a human
rights assessment of data center siting, if
properly presented at the meeting.
|
Shareholder
|
For
|
Against
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: We believe that the adoption of a more comprehensive human rights policy, coupled with
implementation, enforcement, independent monitoring, and transparent, comprehensive reporting will
assure shareholders of the Company's global leadership. We recommend a vote FOR this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
14.
|
A stockholder proposal regarding a report
on data collection, privacy, and security, if
properly presented at the meeting.
|
Shareholder
|
For
|
Against
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: We believe that transparency is important for evaluating risks and ensuring that investors and
stakeholders have adequate information necessary to make informed decisions. After evaluating the details
pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we
recommend a vote FOR this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
15.
|
A stockholder proposal regarding algorithm
disclosures, if properly presented at the
meeting.
|
Shareholder
|
For
|
Against
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: We believe that transparency is important for evaluating risks and ensuring that investors and
stakeholders have adequate information necessary to make informed decisions. After evaluating the details
pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we
recommend a vote FOR this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
16.
|
A stockholder proposal regarding
misinformation and disinformation, if
properly presented at the meeting.
|
Shareholder
|
For
|
Against
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: We believe that transparency is important for evaluating risks and ensuring that investors and
stakeholders have adequate information necessary to make informed decisions. After evaluating the details
pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we
recommend a vote FOR this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
17.
|
A stockholder proposal regarding a report
on external costs of disinformation, if
properly presented at the meeting.
|
Shareholder
|
For
|
Against
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: We believe that transparency is important for evaluating risks and ensuring that investors and
stakeholders have adequate information necessary to make informed decisions. After evaluating the details
pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we
recommend a vote FOR this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
18.
|
A stockholder proposal regarding a report
on board diversity, if properly presented at
the meeting.
|
Shareholder
|
For
|
Against
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: We believe that the proposal warrants shareholder approval. We believe that the proposal
would encourage good governance and enhance shareholder value by bringing together a diverse range of
skills and experience necessary in building a constructive and challenging board. After evaluating the
details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we
recommend a vote FOR this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
19.
|
A stockholder proposal regarding the
establishment of an environmental
sustainability board committee, if properly
presented at the meeting.
|
Shareholder
|
For
|
Against
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: We believe that environmental issues are needed to be escalated at the board level to ensure
proper accountability and oversight. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in
accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
20.
|
A stockholder proposal regarding a policy
on non-management employee
representative director, if properly
presented at the meeting.
|
Shareholder
|
Against
|
Against
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: We believe that the proposal is not necessary and is not in the best long-term interest of the
Company and its shareholders. As such, in accordance with Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend
a vote AGAINST this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
21.
|
A stockholder proposal regarding a report
on policies regarding military and militarized
policing agencies, if properly presented at
the meeting.
|
Shareholder
|
Against
|
Against
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: We do not believe that the review and report requested by this proposal are warranted or that
the report would be informative to shareholders. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder
proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote AGAINST this
Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
TABULA RASA HEALTHCARE, INC.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
Security
|
873379101
|
Meeting Type
|
Annual
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Ticker Symbol
|
TRHC
|
Meeting Date
|
10-Jun-2022
|
||||||||||||||||||||
ISIN
|
US8733791011
|
Agenda
|
935623935 - Management
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Record Date
|
18-Apr-2022
|
Holding Recon Date
|
18-Apr-2022
|
||||||||||||||||||||
City /
|
Country
|
/
|
United
States
|
Vote Deadline
|
09-Jun-2022 11:59 PM ET
|
||||||||||||||||||
SEDOL(s)
|
Quick Code
|
||||||||||||||||||||||
Item
|
Proposal
|
Proposed
by
|
Vote
|
Management
Recommendation
|
For/Against
Management
|
||||||||||||||||||
1.
|
DIRECTOR
|
Management
|
|||||||||||||||||||||
1
|
Dr. Calvin Knowlton
|
Withheld
|
For
|
Against
|
|||||||||||||||||||
2
|
Dr. Orsula Knowlton
|
Withheld
|
For
|
Against
|
|||||||||||||||||||
3
|
A Gordon Tunstall
|
Withheld
|
For
|
Against
|
|||||||||||||||||||
2.
|
Approval, on an advisory basis, of the
compensation of Tabula Rasa HealthCare,
Inc.'s named executive officers.
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
3.
|
Ratification of the selection of KPMG LLP
as Tabula Rasa HealthCare, Inc.'s
independent registered public accounting
firm for the fiscal year ending December 31,
2022.
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
GENERAL MOTORS COMPANY
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
Security
|
37045V100
|
Meeting Type
|
Annual
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Ticker Symbol
|
GM
|
Meeting Date
|
13-Jun-2022
|
||||||||||||||||||||
ISIN
|
US37045V1008
|
Agenda
|
935631778 - Management
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Record Date
|
19-Apr-2022
|
Holding Recon Date
|
19-Apr-2022
|
||||||||||||||||||||
City /
|
Country
|
/
|
United
States
|
Vote Deadline
|
10-Jun-2022 11:59 PM ET
|
||||||||||||||||||
SEDOL(s)
|
Quick Code
|
||||||||||||||||||||||
Item
|
Proposal
|
Proposed
by
|
Vote
|
Management
Recommendation
|
For/Against
Management
|
||||||||||||||||||
1a.
|
Election of Director: Mary T. Barra
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1b.
|
Election of Director: Aneel Bhusri
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1c.
|
Election of Director: Wesley G. Bush
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation
score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor rating and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1d.
|
Election of Director: Linda R. Gooden
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1e.
|
Election of Director: Joseph Jimenez
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation
score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor rating and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1f.
|
Election of Director: Judith A. Miscik
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1g.
|
Election of Director: Patricia F. Russo
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation
score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor rating and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1h.
|
Election of Director: Thomas M. Schoewe
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is
considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit,
Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for
sound corporate governance practice.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1i.
|
Election of Director: Carol M. Stephenson
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation
score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor rating and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1j.
|
Election of Director: Mark A. Tatum
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1k.
|
Election of Director: Devin N. Wenig
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1l.
|
Election of Director: Margaret C. Whitman
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation
score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor rating and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
2.
|
Advisory Approval of Named Executive
Officer Compensation
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we
believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's
directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not
effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote
AGAINST this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
3.
|
Ratification of the Selection of Ernst &
Young LLP as the Company's Independent
Registered Public Accounting Firm for 2022
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor.
Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has
earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model.
After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that
shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST
this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
4.
|
Shareholder Proposal to Lower the
Ownership Threshold to Call a Special
Meeting
|
Shareholder
|
For
|
Against
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: We believe that this proposal is consistent with best corporate governance practices and in the
best interests of the shareholders to permit holders of 10% or more of the Company's outstanding shares of
common stock to call special meetings of shareholders. After evaluating the details pursuant to the
shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote
FOR this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
5.
|
Shareholder Proposal Regarding
Separation of Chair and CEO Roles
|
Shareholder
|
For
|
Against
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: We believe that there is an inherent potential conflict, in having an Inside director serve as the
Chairman of the board. Consequently, we prefer that companies separate the roles of the Chairman and
CEO and that the Chairman be independent to further ensure board independence and accountability. After
evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy
Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
6.
|
Shareholder Proposal Requesting a Report
on the Use of Child Labor in Connection
with Electric Vehicles
|
Shareholder
|
For
|
Against
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: We believe that the proposal warrants shareholder approval. Here, we find that approval of the
proposal will provide the transparency shareholders need to evaluate such activities. After evaluating the
details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Guidelines, we
recommend a vote FOR this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
RESTAURANT BRANDS INTERNATIONAL INC.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
Security
|
76131D103
|
Meeting Type
|
Annual
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Ticker Symbol
|
QSR
|
Meeting Date
|
15-Jun-2022
|
||||||||||||||||||||
ISIN
|
CA76131D1033
|
Agenda
|
935638520 - Management
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Record Date
|
20-Apr-2022
|
Holding Recon Date
|
20-Apr-2022
|
||||||||||||||||||||
City /
|
Country
|
/
|
United
States
|
Vote Deadline
|
14-Jun-2022 11:59 PM ET
|
||||||||||||||||||
SEDOL(s)
|
Quick Code
|
||||||||||||||||||||||
Item
|
Proposal
|
Proposed
by
|
Vote
|
Management
Recommendation
|
For/Against
Management
|
||||||||||||||||||
1.
|
DIRECTOR
|
Management
|
|||||||||||||||||||||
1
|
Alexandre Behring
|
Withheld
|
For
|
Against
|
|||||||||||||||||||
Comments: Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of
Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor rating and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
2
|
João M. Castro-Neves
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
|||||||||||||||||||
3
|
M. de Limburg Stirum
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
|||||||||||||||||||
4
|
Paul J. Fribourg
|
Withheld
|
For
|
Against
|
|||||||||||||||||||
Comments: Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of
Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor rating and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
5
|
Neil Golden
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
|||||||||||||||||||
6
|
Ali Hedayat
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
|||||||||||||||||||
7
|
Golnar Khosrowshahi
|
Withheld
|
For
|
Against
|
|||||||||||||||||||
Comments: Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of
Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor rating and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
8
|
Marc Lemann
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
|||||||||||||||||||
9
|
Jason Melbourne
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
|||||||||||||||||||
10
|
Giovanni (John) Prato
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
|||||||||||||||||||
11
|
Daniel S. Schwartz
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
|||||||||||||||||||
12
|
Thecla Sweeney
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
|||||||||||||||||||
2.
|
Approval, on a non-binding advisory basis,
of the compensation paid to named
executive officers.
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we
believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's
directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not
effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote
AGAINST this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
3.
|
Appoint KPMG LLP as our auditors to serve
until the close of the 2023 Annual General
Meeting of Shareholders and authorize our
directors to fix the auditors' remuneration.
|
Management
|
Withheld
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor.
Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral. This audit firm has earned a
grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model.
After, taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that
shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST
this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
4.
|
Consider a shareholder proposal to report
on business strategy in the face of labour
market pressure including information on
franchisee human capital management.
|
Shareholder
|
For
|
Against
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
AON PLC
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
Security
|
G0403H108
|
Meeting Type
|
Annual
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Ticker Symbol
|
AON
|
Meeting Date
|
17-Jun-2022
|
||||||||||||||||||||
ISIN
|
IE00BLP1HW54
|
Agenda
|
935632857 - Management
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Record Date
|
14-Apr-2022
|
Holding Recon Date
|
14-Apr-2022
|
||||||||||||||||||||
City /
|
Country
|
/
|
United
States
|
Vote Deadline
|
15-Jun-2022 11:59 PM ET
|
||||||||||||||||||
SEDOL(s)
|
Quick Code
|
||||||||||||||||||||||
Item
|
Proposal
|
Proposed
by
|
Vote
|
Management
Recommendation
|
For/Against
Management
|
||||||||||||||||||
1a.
|
Election of Director: Lester B. Knight
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F22 Chairman of the Board and the Company Earns a Cyber Security Risk Score of
Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Chairman of the Board should be held accountable in cases
when the Company obtains the score of Needs Attention on the Cyber Security Risk Score. We believe that
cyber security should be critical for all organizations given the rise of the cyber threats and data breaches in
the corporate scene, which could affect any organization's reputation and lead to declined investor
confidence. As such, Egan-Jones believes that in order to avoid risks of data breaches any cybersecurity
weaknesses should be addressed aggressively in the board room, combined with the proper approach to
cyber risk management, implementation of systems and controls against cybersecurity incidents and the
leadership of the Chairman of the Board.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1b.
|
Election of Director: Gregory C. Case
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1c.
|
Election of Director: Jin-Yong Cai
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1d.
|
Election of Director: Jeffrey C. Campbell
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1e.
|
Election of Director: Fulvio Conti
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is
considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit,
Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for
sound corporate governance practice.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1f.
|
Election of Director: Cheryl A. Francis
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1g.
|
Election of Director: J. Michael Losh
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is
considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit,
Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for
sound corporate governance practice.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1h.
|
Election of Director: Richard C. Notebaert
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is
considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit,
Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for
sound corporate governance practice.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1i.
|
Election of Director: Gloria Santona
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1j.
|
Election of Director: Byron O. Spruell
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1k.
|
Election of Director: Carolyn Y. Woo
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
2.
|
Advisory vote to approve the compensation
of the Company's named executive officers.
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
3.
|
Ratify the appointment of Ernst & Young
LLP as the Company's independent
registered public accounting firm for the
fiscal year ending December 31, 2022.
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor.
Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has
earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model.
After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that
shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST
this Resolution..
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
4.
|
Re-appoint Ernst & Young Chartered
Accountants as the Company's statutory
auditor under Irish law.
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor.
Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has
earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model.
After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that
shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST
these Resolutions.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
5.
|
Authorize the Board or the Audit Committee
of the Board to determine the remuneration
of Ernst & Young Ireland, in its capacity as
the Company's statutory auditor under Irish
law.
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor.
Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has
earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model.
After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that
shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST
these Resolutions.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
VMWARE, INC.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
Security
|
928563402
|
Meeting Type
|
Annual
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Ticker Symbol
|
VMW
|
Meeting Date
|
12-Jul-2022
|
||||||||||||||||||||
ISIN
|
US9285634021
|
Agenda
|
935657645 - Management
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Record Date
|
16-May-2022
|
Holding Recon Date
|
16-May-2022
|
||||||||||||||||||||
City /
|
Country
|
/
|
United
States
|
Vote Deadline
|
11-Jul-2022 11:59 PM ET
|
||||||||||||||||||
SEDOL(s)
|
Quick Code
|
||||||||||||||||||||||
Item
|
Proposal
|
Proposed
by
|
Vote
|
Management
Recommendation
|
For/Against
Management
|
||||||||||||||||||
1a.
|
Election of Director: Nicole Anasenes
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1b.
|
Election of Director: Marianne Brown
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation
score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1c.
|
Election of Director: Paul Sagan
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation
score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
2.
|
An advisory vote to approve named
executive officer compensation, as
described in VMware's Proxy Statement.
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we
believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's
directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not
effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote
AGAINST this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
3.
|
To ratify the selection by the Audit
Committee of VMware's Board of Directors
of PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP as
VMware's independent auditor for the fiscal
year ending February 3, 2023.
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor.
Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has
earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model.
After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that
shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST
this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
TAKE-TWO INTERACTIVE SOFTWARE, INC.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
Security
|
874054109
|
Meeting Type
|
Annual
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Ticker Symbol
|
TTWO
|
Meeting Date
|
16-Sep-2022
|
||||||||||||||||||||
ISIN
|
US8740541094
|
Agenda
|
935695366 - Management
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Record Date
|
25-Jul-2022
|
Holding Recon Date
|
25-Jul-2022
|
||||||||||||||||||||
City /
|
Country
|
/
|
United
States
|
Vote Deadline
|
15-Sep-2022 11:59 PM ET
|
||||||||||||||||||
SEDOL(s)
|
Quick Code
|
||||||||||||||||||||||
Item
|
Proposal
|
Proposed
by
|
Vote
|
Management
Recommendation
|
For/Against
Management
|
||||||||||||||||||
1a.
|
Election of Director: Strauss Zelnick
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F21 Combined CEO and Board Chair Positions and the Company Earns a Board Score of
Some Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that there is an inherent potential conflict, in having the CEO or former
CEO serve as the Chairman of the Board. Consequently, we prefer that companies focus on the following
areas to improve its corporate governance practices: separate the roles of the Chairman and CEO, hold
annual director elections, have one class of voting stock only, have key board committees consisting of
independent directors and majority of independent directors on board and include non-binding
compensation vote on agenda to further ensure board independence and accountability.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1b.
|
Election of Director: Michael Dornemann
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is
considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit,
Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for
sound corporate governance practice.
F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some
Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1c.
|
Election of Director: J. Moses
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is
considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit,
Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for
sound corporate governance practice.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some
Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1d.
|
Election of Director: Michael Sheresky
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is
considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit,
Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for
sound corporate governance practice.
F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some
Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1e.
|
Election of Director: LaVerne Srinivasan
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1f.
|
Election of Director: Susan Tolson
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1g.
|
Election of Director: Paul Viera
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1h.
|
Election of Director: Roland Hernandez
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation
score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1i.
|
Election of Director: William "Bing" Gordon
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1j.
|
Election of Director: Ellen Siminoff
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
2.
|
Approval, on a non-binding advisory basis,
of the compensation of the Company's
"named executive officers" as disclosed in
the Proxy Statement.
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we
believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's
directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not
effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote
AGAINST this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
3.
|
Ratification of the appointment of Ernst &
Young LLP as our independent registered
public accounting firm for the fiscal year
ending March 31, 2023.
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor.
Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has
earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model.
After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that
shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST
this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
PROLOGIS, INC.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
Security
|
74340W103
|
Meeting Type
|
Special
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Ticker Symbol
|
PLD
|
Meeting Date
|
28-Sep-2022
|
||||||||||||||||||||
ISIN
|
US74340W1036
|
Agenda
|
935697651 - Management
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Record Date
|
29-Jul-2022
|
Holding Recon Date
|
29-Jul-2022
|
||||||||||||||||||||
City /
|
Country
|
/
|
United
States
|
Vote Deadline
|
27-Sep-2022 11:59 PM ET
|
||||||||||||||||||
SEDOL(s)
|
Quick Code
|
||||||||||||||||||||||
Item
|
Proposal
|
Proposed
by
|
Vote
|
Management
Recommendation
|
For/Against
Management
|
||||||||||||||||||
1.
|
To approve the "Prologis common stock
issuance proposal" (as defined in the Proxy
Statement), which involves the issuance of
common stock of Prologis, Inc. in
connection with the merger of Duke Realty
Corporation with and into Compton Merger
Sub LLC, pursuant to which each
outstanding share of Duke Realty
Corporation common stock will be
converted into the right to receive 0.475 of a
newly issued share of Prologis, Inc.
common stock, on the terms and conditions
set forth in the Agreement and Plan of
Merger, dated as of June 11, 2022.
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
2.
|
To approve one or more adjournments of
the Prologis, Inc. special meeting to another
date, time or place, if necessary or
appropriate, to solicit additional proxies in
favor of the Prologis common stock
issuance proposal (the "Prologis
adjournment proposal").
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
PROLOGIS, INC.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
Security
|
74340W103
|
Meeting Type
|
Special
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Ticker Symbol
|
PLD
|
Meeting Date
|
28-Sep-2022
|
||||||||||||||||||||
ISIN
|
US74340W1036
|
Agenda
|
935699554 - Management
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Record Date
|
08-Aug-2022
|
Holding Recon Date
|
08-Aug-2022
|
||||||||||||||||||||
City /
|
Country
|
/
|
United
States
|
Vote Deadline
|
27-Sep-2022 11:59 PM ET
|
||||||||||||||||||
SEDOL(s)
|
Quick Code
|
||||||||||||||||||||||
Item
|
Proposal
|
Proposed
by
|
Vote
|
Management
Recommendation
|
For/Against
Management
|
||||||||||||||||||
1.
|
To approve the "Prologis common stock
issuance proposal" (as defined in the Proxy
Statement), which involves the issuance of
common stock of Prologis, Inc. in
connection with the merger of Duke Realty
Corporation with and into Compton Merger
Sub LLC, pursuant to which each
outstanding share of Duke Realty
Corporation common stock will be
converted into the right to receive 0.475 of a
newly issued share of Prologis, Inc.
common stock, on the terms and conditions
set forth in the Agreement and Plan of
Merger, dated as of June 11, 2022.
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
2.
|
To approve one or more adjournments of
the Prologis, Inc. special meeting to another
date, time or place, if necessary or
appropriate, to solicit additional proxies in
favor of the Prologis common stock
issuance proposal (the "Prologis
adjournment proposal").
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
VMWARE, INC.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
Security
|
928563402
|
Meeting Type
|
Special
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Ticker Symbol
|
VMW
|
Meeting Date
|
04-Nov-2022
|
||||||||||||||||||||
ISIN
|
US9285634021
|
Agenda
|
935720563 - Management
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Record Date
|
30-Sep-2022
|
Holding Recon Date
|
30-Sep-2022
|
||||||||||||||||||||
City /
|
Country
|
/
|
United
States
|
Vote Deadline
|
03-Nov-2022 11:59 PM ET
|
||||||||||||||||||
SEDOL(s)
|
Quick Code
|
||||||||||||||||||||||
Item
|
Proposal
|
Proposed
by
|
Vote
|
Management
Recommendation
|
For/Against
Management
|
||||||||||||||||||
1.
|
The Merger Agreement Proposal: To vote
on a proposal to approve the First Merger
and the Second Merger (each as defined
below) & to adopt the Agreement & Plan of
Merger ("Merger Agreement"), dated as of
May 26, 2022, by and among VMware, Inc.
("VMware"), Broadcom Inc. ("Broadcom"),
Verona Holdco, Inc., a direct wholly owned
subsidiary of VMware ("Holdco"), Verona
Merger Sub, Inc., a direct wholly owned
subsidiary of Holdco ("Merger Sub 1"),
Barcelona Merger Sub 2, Inc., a direct
wholly owned subsidiary of Broadcom
("Merger Sub 2"), and Barcelona Merger
Sub 3, LLC.
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
2.
|
The Merger-Related Compensation
Proposal: To vote on a proposal to approve
on an advisory (non-binding) basis the
compensation that may be paid or become
payable to VMware's named executive
officers that is based on or otherwise
relates to the Transactions.
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: While, as described above, we support voting for the proposed merger, and while recognizing
that this golden parachute proposal is advisory (the voting results of which should not interfere with passage
of the merger), we are compelled to comment that, in our view, the total compensation of the executives is
excessive by any reasonable standard. Excessive executive compensation packages have been on-going
cause of concern among shareholders and investors. While the Company argues that its severance and
termination payments are based upon the employment agreement, in our view and based on the foregoing,
the golden parachute exceeds of what we believe is excessive and is not in the best interests of the
Company and its stockholders. We recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
3.
|
The Adjournment Proposal: To vote on a
proposal to approve the adjournment of the
special meeting, if necessary, to solicit
additional proxies if there are not sufficient
votes to approve the Merger Agreement
Proposal.
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
4.
|
Charter Amendment Proposal: To vote to
approve and adopt an amendment to
VMware's Certificate of Incorporation to
eliminate the personal liability of VMware's
officers for monetary damages for breach of
fiduciary duty as an officer, except to the
extent such an exemption from liability or
limitation thereof is not permitted by the
General Corporation Law of the State of
Delaware.
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
ORACLE CORPORATION
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
Security
|
68389X105
|
Meeting Type
|
Annual
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Ticker Symbol
|
ORCL
|
Meeting Date
|
16-Nov-2022
|
||||||||||||||||||||
ISIN
|
US68389X1054
|
Agenda
|
935715182 - Management
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Record Date
|
19-Sep-2022
|
Holding Recon Date
|
19-Sep-2022
|
||||||||||||||||||||
City /
|
Country
|
/
|
United
States
|
Vote Deadline
|
15-Nov-2022 11:59 PM ET
|
||||||||||||||||||
SEDOL(s)
|
Quick Code
|
||||||||||||||||||||||
Item
|
Proposal
|
Proposed
by
|
Vote
|
Management
Recommendation
|
For/Against
Management
|
||||||||||||||||||
1.
|
DIRECTOR
|
Management
|
|||||||||||||||||||||
1
|
Awo Ablo
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
|||||||||||||||||||
2
|
Jeffrey S. Berg
|
Withheld
|
For
|
Against
|
|||||||||||||||||||
Comments: Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is
considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit,
Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for
sound corporate governance practice.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
3
|
Michael J. Boskin
|
Withheld
|
For
|
Against
|
|||||||||||||||||||
Comments: Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is
considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit,
Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for
sound corporate governance practice.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
4
|
Safra A. Catz
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
|||||||||||||||||||
5
|
Bruce R. Chizen
|
Withheld
|
For
|
Against
|
|||||||||||||||||||
Comments: Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is
considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit,
Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for
sound corporate governance practice.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
6
|
George H. Conrades
|
Withheld
|
For
|
Against
|
|||||||||||||||||||
Comments: Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is
considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit,
Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for
sound corporate governance practice. Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a
compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
7
|
Lawrence J. Ellison
|
Withheld
|
For
|
Against
|
|||||||||||||||||||
Comments: Chairman of the Board and the Company Earns a Cyber Security Risk Score of Needs
Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Chairman of the Board should be held accountable in cases
when the Company obtains the score of Needs Attention on the Cyber Security Risk Score. We believe that
cyber security should be critical for all organizations given the rise of the cyber threats and data breaches in
the corporate scene, which could affect any organization's reputation and lead to declined investor
confidence. As such, Egan-Jones believes that in order to avoid risks of data breaches any cybersecurity
weaknesses should be addressed aggressively in the board room, combined with the proper approach to
cyber risk management, implementation of systems and controls against cybersecurity incidents and the
leadership of the Chairman of the Board.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
8
|
Rona A. Fairhead
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
|||||||||||||||||||
9
|
Jeffrey O. Henley
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
|||||||||||||||||||
10
|
Renee J. James
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
|||||||||||||||||||
11
|
Charles W. Moorman
|
Withheld
|
For
|
Against
|
|||||||||||||||||||
Comments: Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of
Some Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
12
|
Leon E. Panetta
|
Withheld
|
For
|
Against
|
|||||||||||||||||||
Comments: Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of
Some Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
13
|
William G. Parrett
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
|||||||||||||||||||
14
|
Naomi O. Seligman
|
Withheld
|
For
|
Against
|
|||||||||||||||||||
Comments: Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of
Some Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
15
|
Vishal Sikka
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
|||||||||||||||||||
2.
|
Advisory Vote to Approve the
Compensation of our Named Executive
Officers.
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we
believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's
directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not
effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote
AGAINST this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
3.
|
Ratification of the Selection of our
Independent Registered Public Accounting
Firm.
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor.
Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has
earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model.
After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that
shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST
this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
MICROSOFT CORPORATION
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
Security
|
594918104
|
Meeting Type
|
Annual
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Ticker Symbol
|
MSFT
|
Meeting Date
|
13-Dec-2022
|
||||||||||||||||||||
ISIN
|
US5949181045
|
Agenda
|
935722567 - Management
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Record Date
|
12-Oct-2022
|
Holding Recon Date
|
12-Oct-2022
|
||||||||||||||||||||
City /
|
Country
|
/
|
United
States
|
Vote Deadline
|
12-Dec-2022 11:59 PM ET
|
||||||||||||||||||
SEDOL(s)
|
Quick Code
|
||||||||||||||||||||||
Item
|
Proposal
|
Proposed
by
|
Vote
|
Management
Recommendation
|
For/Against
Management
|
||||||||||||||||||
1a.
|
Election of Director: Reid G. Hoffman
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1b.
|
Election of Director: Hugh F. Johnston
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1c.
|
Election of Director: Teri L. List
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1d.
|
Election of Director: Satya Nadella
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F22 Chairman of the Board and the Company Earns a Cyber Security Risk Score of Needs
Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Chairman of the Board should be held accountable in cases
when the Company obtains the score of Needs Attention on the Cyber Security Risk Score. We believe that
cyber security should be critical for all organizations given the rise of the cyber threats and data breaches in
the corporate scene, which could affect any organization's reputation and lead to declined investor
confidence. As such, Egan-Jones believes that in order to avoid risks of data breaches any cybersecurity
weaknesses should be addressed aggressively in the board room, combined with the proper approach to
cyber risk management, implementation of systems and controls against cybersecurity incidents and the
leadership of the Chairman of the Board.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1e.
|
Election of Director: Sandra E. Peterson
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation
score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1f.
|
Election of Director: Penny S. Pritzker
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1g.
|
Election of Director: Carlos A. Rodriguez
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1h.
|
Election of Director: Charles W. Scharf
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation
score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1i.
|
Election of Director: John W. Stanton
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1j.
|
Election of Director: John W. Thompson
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1k.
|
Election of Director: Emma N. Walmsley
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation
score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1l.
|
Election of Director: Padmasree Warrior
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation
score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
2.
|
Advisory vote to approve named executive
officer compensation
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we
believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's
directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not
effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote
AGAINST this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
3.
|
Ratification of the Selection of Deloitte &
Touche LLP as our Independent Auditor for
Fiscal Year 2023
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor.
Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has
earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model.
After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that
shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST
this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
4.
|
Shareholder Proposal - Cost/Benefit
Analysis of Diversity and Inclusion
|
Shareholder
|
For
|
Against
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: We believe that transparency is important for evaluating risks and ensuring that investors and
stakeholders have adequate information necessary to make informed decisions. Accordingly, we
recommend a vote FOR this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
5.
|
Shareholder Proposal - Report on Hiring of
Persons with Arrest or Incarceration
Records
|
Shareholder
|
For
|
Against
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: We believe that a company's success depends upon its ability to embrace diversity. As such,
we believe that adoption of this proposal is in the best interests of the Company and its shareholders. As
such, in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
6.
|
Shareholder Proposal - Report on
Investment of Retirement Funds in
Companies Contributing to Climate Change
|
Shareholder
|
Against
|
Against
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
7.
|
Shareholder Proposal - Report on
Government Use of Microsoft Technology
|
Shareholder
|
For
|
Against
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: We believe that the proposal warrants shareholder approval. Here, we find that approval of the
proposal will provide the transparency shareholders need to evaluate such activities. After evaluating the
details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Guidelines, we
recommend a vote FOR this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
8.
|
Shareholder Proposal - Report on
Development of Products for Military
|
Shareholder
|
Against
|
Against
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
9.
|
Shareholder Proposal - Report on Tax
Transparency
|
Shareholder
|
Against
|
Against
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
BERRY GLOBAL GROUP, INC.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
Security
|
08579W103
|
Meeting Type
|
Annual
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Ticker Symbol
|
BERY
|
Meeting Date
|
15-Feb-2023
|
||||||||||||||||||||
ISIN
|
US08579W1036
|
Agenda
|
935756265 - Management
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Record Date
|
27-Dec-2022
|
Holding Recon Date
|
27-Dec-2022
|
||||||||||||||||||||
City /
|
Country
|
/
|
United
States
|
Vote Deadline
|
14-Feb-2023 11:59 PM ET
|
||||||||||||||||||
SEDOL(s)
|
Quick Code
|
||||||||||||||||||||||
Item
|
Proposal
|
Proposed
by
|
Vote
|
Management
Recommendation
|
For/Against
Management
|
||||||||||||||||||
1a.
|
Election of Director: B. Evan Bayh
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is
considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit,
Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for
sound corporate governance practice.
Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some
Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1b.
|
Election of Director: Jonathan F. Foster
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of
Some Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1c.
|
Election of Director: Idalene F. Kesner
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1d.
|
Election of Director: Jill A. Rahman
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1e.
|
Election of Director: Carl J. Rickertsen
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is
considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit,
Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for
sound corporate governance practice.
Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some
Concerns or Needs Attention
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1f.
|
Election of Director: Thomas E. Salmon
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: Chairman of the Board and the Company Earns a Cyber Security Risk Score of Needs
Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Chairman of the Board should be held accountable in cases
when the Company obtains the score of Needs Attention on the Cyber Security Risk Score. We believe that
cyber security should be critical for all organizations given the rise of the cyber threats and data breaches in
the corporate scene, which could affect any organization's reputation and lead to declined investor
confidence. As such, Egan-Jones believes that in order to avoid risks of data breaches any cybersecurity
weaknesses should be addressed aggressively in the board room, combined with the proper approach to
cyber risk management, implementation of systems and controls against cybersecurity incidents and the
leadership of the Chairman of the Board.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1g.
|
Election of Director: Chaney M. Sheffield
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1h.
|
Election of Director: Robert A. Steele
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1i.
|
Election of Director: Stephen E. Sterrett
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1j.
|
Election of Director: Scott B. Ullem
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of
Some Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
2.
|
To ratify the selection of Ernst & Young LLP
as Berry's independent registered public
accountants for the fiscal year ending
September 30, 2023.
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor.
Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has
earned a grade of Some Concerns and thus, has failed to pass our model.
After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that
shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST
this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
3.
|
To approve, on an advisory, non-binding
basis, our executive compensation.
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we
believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's
directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not
effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote
AGAINST this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
ANALOG DEVICES, INC.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
Security
|
032654105
|
Meeting Type
|
Annual
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Ticker Symbol
|
ADI
|
Meeting Date
|
08-Mar-2023
|
||||||||||||||||||||
ISIN
|
US0326541051
|
Agenda
|
935758740 - Management
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Record Date
|
03-Jan-2023
|
Holding Recon Date
|
03-Jan-2023
|
||||||||||||||||||||
City /
|
Country
|
/
|
United
States
|
Vote Deadline
|
07-Mar-2023 11:59 PM ET
|
||||||||||||||||||
SEDOL(s)
|
Quick Code
|
||||||||||||||||||||||
Item
|
Proposal
|
Proposed
by
|
Vote
|
Management
Recommendation
|
For/Against
Management
|
||||||||||||||||||
1a.
|
Election of Director: Vincent Roche
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: Chairman of the Board and the Company Earns a Cyber Security Risk Score of Needs
Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Chairman of the Board should be held accountable in cases
when the Company obtains the score of Needs Attention on the Cyber Security Risk Score. We believe that
cyber security should be critical for all organizations given the rise of the cyber threats and data breaches in
the corporate scene, which could affect any organization's reputation and lead to declined investor
confidence. As such, Egan-Jones believes that in order to avoid risks of data breaches any cybersecurity
weaknesses should be addressed aggressively in the board room, combined with the proper approach to
cyber risk management, implementation of systems and controls against cybersecurity incidents and the
leadership of the Chairman of the Board.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1b.
|
Election of Director: James A. Champy
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is
considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit,
Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for
sound corporate governance practice.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1c.
|
Election of Director: André Andonian
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1d.
|
Election of Director: Anantha P.
Chandrakasan
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1e.
|
Election of Director: Edward H. Frank
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of
Some Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1f.
|
Election of Director: Laurie H. Glimcher
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of
Some Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1g.
|
Election of Director: Karen M. Golz
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1h.
|
Election of Director: Mercedes Johnson
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1i.
|
Election of Director: Kenton J. Sicchitano
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is
considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit,
Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for
sound corporate governance practice.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1j.
|
Election of Director: Ray Stata
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1k.
|
Election of Director: Susie Wee
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of
Some Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
2.
|
Advisory vote to approve the compensation
of our named executive officers.
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we
believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's
directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not
effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote
AGAINST this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
3.
|
Advisory vote on the frequency of future
advisory votes on the compensation of our
named executive officers.
|
Management
|
1 Year
|
1 Year
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
4.
|
Ratification of the selection of Ernst &
Young LLP as our independent registered
public accounting firm for fiscal year 2023.
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor.
Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has
earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model.
After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that
shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST
this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
APPLE INC.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
Security
|
037833100
|
Meeting Type
|
Annual
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Ticker Symbol
|
AAPL
|
Meeting Date
|
10-Mar-2023
|
||||||||||||||||||||
ISIN
|
US0378331005
|
Agenda
|
935757700 - Management
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Record Date
|
09-Jan-2023
|
Holding Recon Date
|
09-Jan-2023
|
||||||||||||||||||||
City /
|
Country
|
/
|
United
States
|
Vote Deadline
|
09-Mar-2023 11:59 PM ET
|
||||||||||||||||||
SEDOL(s)
|
Quick Code
|
||||||||||||||||||||||
Item
|
Proposal
|
Proposed
by
|
Vote
|
Management
Recommendation
|
For/Against
Management
|
||||||||||||||||||
1a
|
Election of Director: James Bell
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1b
|
Election of Director: Tim Cook
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1c
|
Election of Director: Al Gore
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is
considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit,
Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for
sound corporate governance practice.
F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some
Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1d
|
Election of Director: Alex Gorsky
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1e
|
Election of Director: Andrea Jung
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation
score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1f
|
Election of Director: Art Levinson
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is
considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit,
Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for
sound corporate governance practice.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some
Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
F22 Chairman of the Board and the Company Earns a Cyber Security Risk Score of Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Chairman of the Board should be held accountable in cases
when the Company obtains the score of Needs Attention on the Cyber Security Risk Score. We believe that
cyber security should be critical for all organizations given the rise of the cyber threats and data breaches in
the corporate scene, which could affect any organization's reputation and lead to declined investor
confidence. As such, Egan-Jones believes that in order to avoid risks of data breaches any cybersecurity
weaknesses should be addressed aggressively in the board room, combined with the proper approach to
cyber risk management, implementation of systems and controls against cybersecurity incidents and the
leadership of the Chairman of the Board.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1g
|
Election of Director: Monica Lozano
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1h
|
Election of Director: Ron Sugar
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is
considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit,
Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for
sound corporate governance practice.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1i
|
Election of Director: Sue Wagner
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
2.
|
Ratification of the appointment of Ernst &
Young LLP as Apple's independent
registered public accounting firm for fiscal
2023
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor.
Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has
earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model.
After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that
shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST
this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
3.
|
Advisory vote to approve executive
compensation
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we
believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's
directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not
effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote
AGAINST this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
4.
|
Advisory vote on the frequency of advisory
votes on executive compensation
|
Management
|
1 Year
|
1 Year
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
5.
|
A shareholder proposal entitled "Civil Rights
and Non-Discrimination Audit Proposal"
|
Shareholder
|
For
|
Against
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: We believe that a company's success depends upon its ability to embrace diversity in the
community it serves. As such, we believe that adoption of this proposal is in the best interests of the
Company and its shareholders. As such, in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Guidelines, we recommend a
vote FOR this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
6.
|
A shareholder proposal entitled "Communist
China Audit"
|
Shareholder
|
For
|
Against
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: We believe that transparency is important for evaluating risks and ensuring that investors and
stakeholders have adequate information necessary to make informed decisions. Accordingly, we
recommend a vote FOR this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
7.
|
A shareholder proposal on Board policy for
communication with shareholder
proponents
|
Shareholder
|
Against
|
Against
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
8.
|
A shareholder proposal entitled "Racial and
Gender Pay Gaps"
|
Shareholder
|
For
|
Against
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: We believe that approval of the proposal is necessary and warranted in the Company. Pay
disparities by gender and race in companies, in our view, could bring operational risks and reputational
damage that is detrimental to shareholder value. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder
proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
9.
|
A shareholder proposal entitled
"Shareholder Proxy Access Amendments"
|
Shareholder
|
For
|
Against
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: We believe that adopting a proxy access bylaw in accordance to the shareholder proposal is in
the best interests of the Company and its shareholders. After evaluating the details pursuant to the
shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote
FOR this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
ADOBE INC.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
Security
|
00724F101
|
Meeting Type
|
Annual
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Ticker Symbol
|
ADBE
|
Meeting Date
|
20-Apr-2023
|
||||||||||||||||||||
ISIN
|
US00724F1012
|
Agenda
|
935770126 - Management
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Record Date
|
21-Feb-2023
|
Holding Recon Date
|
21-Feb-2023
|
||||||||||||||||||||
City /
|
Country
|
/
|
United
States
|
Vote Deadline
|
19-Apr-2023 11:59 PM ET
|
||||||||||||||||||
SEDOL(s)
|
Quick Code
|
||||||||||||||||||||||
Item
|
Proposal
|
Proposed
by
|
Vote
|
Management
Recommendation
|
For/Against
Management
|
||||||||||||||||||
1a.
|
Election of Director to serve for a one-year
term: Amy Banse
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns
or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for
such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are
centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its
shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the
Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes
that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a
whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the
performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be
proposed in the future.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1b.
|
Election of Director to serve for a one-year
term: Brett Biggs
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1c.
|
Election of Director to serve for a one-year
term: Melanie Boulden
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns
or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for
such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are
centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its
shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the
Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes
that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a
whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the
performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be
proposed in the future.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1d.
|
Election of Director to serve for a one-year
term: Frank Calderoni
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is
considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit,
Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for
sound corporate governance practice.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1e.
|
Election of Director to serve for a one-year
term: Laura Desmond
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns
or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for
such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are
centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its
shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the
Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes
that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a
whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the
performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be
proposed in the future.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1f.
|
Election of Director to serve for a one-year
term: Shantanu Narayen
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F22 Chairman of the Board and the Company Earns a Cyber Security Risk Score of
Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Chairman of the Board should be held accountable in cases
when the Company obtains the score of Needs Attention on the Cyber Security Risk Score. We believe that
cyber security should be critical for all organizations given the rise of the cyber threats and data breaches in
the corporate scene, which could affect any organization's reputation and lead to declined investor
confidence. As such, Egan-Jones believes that in order to avoid risks of data breaches any cybersecurity
weaknesses should be addressed aggressively in the board room, combined with the proper approach to
cyber risk management, implementation of systems and controls against cybersecurity incidents and the
leadership of the Chairman of the Board.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1g.
|
Election of Director to serve for a one-year
term: Spencer Neumann
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1h.
|
Election of Director to serve for a one-year
term: Kathleen Oberg
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1i.
|
Election of Director to serve for a one-year
term: Dheeraj Pandey
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1j.
|
Election of Director to serve for a one-year
term: David Ricks
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns
or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for
such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are
centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its
shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the
Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes
that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a
whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the
performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be
proposed in the future.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1k.
|
Election of Director to serve for a one-year
term: Daniel Rosensweig
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is
considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit,
Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for
sound corporate governance practice.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1l.
|
Election of Director to serve for a one-year
term: John Warnock
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
2.
|
Approve the 2019 Equity Incentive Plan, as
amended, to increase the available share
reserve by 12,000,000 shares.
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: After taking into account the maximum amount of shareholder equity dilution this proposal could
cause, as well as both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that
shareholders should not support the passage of this plan as proposed by the board of directors. We
recommend the board seek to align CEO pay more closely with the performance of the company and work
to reduce the cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. Therefore, we recommend a vote
AGAINST this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
3.
|
Ratify the appointment of KPMG LLP as our
independent registered public accounting
firm for our fiscal year ending on December
1, 2023.
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor.
Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has
earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model.
After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that
shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST
this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
4.
|
Approve, on an advisory basis, the
compensation of our named executive
officers.
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we
believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's
directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not
effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote
AGAINST this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
5.
|
Approve, on an advisory basis, the
frequency of the advisory vote on executive
compensation.
|
Management
|
1 Year
|
1 Year
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
6.
|
Stockholder Proposal - Report on Hiring of
Persons with Arrest or Incarceration
Records.
|
Shareholder
|
For
|
Against
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: We believe that a company's success depends upon its ability to embrace diversity and to draw
upon the skills, expertise and experience of its workforce. As such, we believe that adoption of this proposal
is in the best interests of the Company and its shareholders. As such, in accordance with the Egan-Jones'
Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
NESTLE S.A.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
Security
|
641069406
|
Meeting Type
|
Annual
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Ticker Symbol
|
NSRGY
|
Meeting Date
|
20-Apr-2023
|
||||||||||||||||||||
ISIN
|
US6410694060
|
Agenda
|
935795039 - Management
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Record Date
|
13-Mar-2023
|
Holding Recon Date
|
13-Mar-2023
|
||||||||||||||||||||
City /
|
Country
|
/
|
United
States
|
Vote Deadline
|
12-Apr-2023 11:59 PM ET
|
||||||||||||||||||
SEDOL(s)
|
Quick Code
|
||||||||||||||||||||||
Item
|
Proposal
|
Proposed
by
|
Vote
|
Management
Recommendation
|
For/Against
Management
|
||||||||||||||||||
1A
|
Approval of the Annual Review, the
financial statements of Nestlé S.A. and the
consolidated financial statements of the
Nestlé Group for 2022
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1B
|
Acceptance of the Compensation Report
2022 (advisory vote)
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we
believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's
directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not
effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote
AGAINST this Resolution.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
2
|
Discharge to the members of the Board of
Directors and of the Management for 2022
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
3
|
Appropriation of profit resulting from the
balance sheet of Nestlé S.A. (proposed
dividend) for the financial year 2022
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
4AA
|
Re-election of the member of the Board of
Director: Paul Bulcke, as member and
Chairman
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
4AB
|
Re-election of the member of the Board of
Director: Ulf Mark Schneider
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
4AC
|
Re-election of the member of the Board of
Director: Henri de Castries
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
4AD
|
Re-election of the member of the Board of
Director: Renato Fassbind
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
4AE
|
Re-election of the member of the Board of
Director: Pablo Isla
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of
Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor rating and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
4AF
|
Re-election of the member of the Board of
Director: Patrick Aebischer
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of
Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor rating and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
4AG
|
Re-election of the member of the Board of
Director: Kimberly A. Ross
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
4AH
|
Re-election of the member of the Board of
Director: Dick Boer
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of
Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor rating and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
4AI
|
Re-election of the member of the Board of
Director: Dinesh Paliwal
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of
Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor rating and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
4AJ
|
Re-election of the member of the Board of
Director: Hanne Jimenez de Mora
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
4AK
|
Re-election of the member of the Board of
Director: Lindiwe Majele Sibanda
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
4AL
|
Re-election of the member of the Board of
Director: Chris Leong
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
4AM
|
Re-election of the member of the Board of
Director: Luca Maestri
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
4BA
|
Election to the Board of Director: Rainer
Blair
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
4BB
|
Election to the Board of Director: Marie-
Gabrielle Ineichen-Fleisch
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
4CA
|
Election of the member of the
Compensation Committee: Pablo Isla
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of
Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor rating and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
4CB
|
Election of the member of the
Compensation Committee: Patrick
Aebischer
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of
Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor rating and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
4CC
|
Election of the member of the
Compensation Committee: Dick Boer
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of
Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor rating and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
4CD
|
Election of the member of the
Compensation Committee: Dinesh Paliwal
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of
Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor rating and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
4D
|
Election of the statutory auditors Ernst &
Young Ltd, Lausanne branch
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor.
Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral. This audit firm has earned a
grade of Some Concerns and thus, has failed to pass our model.
After, taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that
shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST
this Resolution.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
4E
|
Election of the Independent Representative
Hartmann Dreyer, Attorneys-at-law
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
5A
|
Approval of the compensation of the Board
of Directors
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
5B
|
Approval of the compensation of the
Executive Board
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: While we recognize that approval of this proposal will help the Company to attract, retain and
motivate its executives and key personnel whose efforts are essential to its success, however, given the
Compensation Score we give this Company, we recommend that clients vote AGAINST this Resolution.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
6
|
Capital reduction (by cancellation of shares)
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
7A
|
Amendments of Provisions of the Articles of
Association pertaining to the General
Meeting
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
7B
|
Amendments of Provisions of the Articles of
Association pertaining to the Board of
Directors, Compensation, Contracts and
Mandates and Miscellaneous Provisions
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
8
|
In the event of any yet unknown new or
modified proposal by a shareholder during
the General Meeting, I instruct the
Independent Representative to vote as
follows.
|
Management
|
Against
|
Against
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: We do not recommend that shareholders approve in advance matters of which they have no
knowledge. Accordingly, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Resolution.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
APTIV PLC
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
Security
|
G6095L109
|
Meeting Type
|
Annual
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Ticker Symbol
|
APTV
|
Meeting Date
|
26-Apr-2023
|
||||||||||||||||||||
ISIN
|
JE00B783TY65
|
Agenda
|
935775443 - Management
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Record Date
|
02-Mar-2023
|
Holding Recon Date
|
02-Mar-2023
|
||||||||||||||||||||
City /
|
Country
|
/
|
United
States
|
Vote Deadline
|
21-Apr-2023 11:59 PM ET
|
||||||||||||||||||
SEDOL(s)
|
Quick Code
|
||||||||||||||||||||||
Item
|
Proposal
|
Proposed
by
|
Vote
|
Management
Recommendation
|
For/Against
Management
|
||||||||||||||||||
1a.
|
Election of Director: Kevin P. Clark
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1b.
|
Election of Director: Richard L. Clemmer
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1c.
|
Election of Director: Nancy E. Cooper
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1d.
|
Election of Director: Joseph L. Hooley
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation
score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1e.
|
Election of Director: Merit E. Janow
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation
score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1f.
|
Election of Director: Sean O. Mahoney
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is
considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit,
Compensation and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for
sound corporate governance practice.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1g.
|
Election of Director: Paul M. Meister
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation
score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1h.
|
Election of Director: Robert K. Ortberg
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1i.
|
Election of Director: Colin J. Parris
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1j.
|
Election of Director: Ana G. Pinczuk
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
2.
|
Proposal to re-appoint auditors, ratify
independent public accounting firm and
authorize the directors to determine the
fees paid to the auditors.
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor.
Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has
earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model.
After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that
shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST
this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
3.
|
Say-on-Pay - To approve, by advisory vote,
executive compensation.
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we
believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's
directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not
effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote
AGAINST this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
GLOBAL PAYMENTS INC.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
Security
|
37940X102
|
Meeting Type
|
Annual
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Ticker Symbol
|
GPN
|
Meeting Date
|
27-Apr-2023
|
||||||||||||||||||||
ISIN
|
US37940X1028
|
Agenda
|
935777093 - Management
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Record Date
|
03-Mar-2023
|
Holding Recon Date
|
03-Mar-2023
|
||||||||||||||||||||
City /
|
Country
|
/
|
United
States
|
Vote Deadline
|
26-Apr-2023 11:59 PM ET
|
||||||||||||||||||
SEDOL(s)
|
Quick Code
|
||||||||||||||||||||||
Item
|
Proposal
|
Proposed
by
|
Vote
|
Management
Recommendation
|
For/Against
Management
|
||||||||||||||||||
1a.
|
Election of Director: F. Thaddeus Arroyo
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1b.
|
Election of Director: Robert H.B. Baldwin,
Jr.
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation
score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1c.
|
Election of Director: John G. Bruno
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation
score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1d.
|
Election of Director: Joia M. Johnson
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation
score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1e.
|
Election of Director: Ruth Ann Marshall
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1f.
|
Election of Director: Connie D. McDaniel
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1g.
|
Election of Director: Joseph H. Osnoss
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation
score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1h.
|
Election of Director: William B. Plummer
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1i.
|
Election of Director: Jeffrey S. Sloan
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1j.
|
Election of Director: John T. Turner
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1k.
|
Election of Director: M. Troy Woods
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
2.
|
Approval, on an advisory basis, of the
compensation of our named executive
officers for 2022.
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we
believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's
directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not
effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote
AGAINST this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
3.
|
Approval, on an advisory basis, of the
frequency of the advisory vote on executive
compensation.
|
Management
|
1 Year
|
1 Year
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
4.
|
Ratification of the appointment of Deloitte &
Touche LLP as our independent registered
public accounting firm for the year ending
December 31, 2023.
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor.
Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has
earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model.
After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that
shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST
this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
5.
|
Advisory shareholder proposal on
shareholder ratification of termination pay.
|
Shareholder
|
For
|
Against
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: We believe that the Company's compensation practices have been and will continue to be a
key factor in the ability to deliver strong results. Furthermore, we believe that adopting the this proposal
would put the Company at a competitive advantage in recruiting and retaining executive talent and that it is
in the best interests of the Company and its stockholders for the independent Compensation Committee to
retain the flexibility to design and administer competitive compensation program. After evaluating the details
pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we
recommend a vote FOR this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
CROWN HOLDINGS, INC.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
Security
|
228368106
|
Meeting Type
|
Annual
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Ticker Symbol
|
CCK
|
Meeting Date
|
27-Apr-2023
|
||||||||||||||||||||
ISIN
|
US2283681060
|
Agenda
|
935790116 - Management
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Record Date
|
07-Mar-2023
|
Holding Recon Date
|
07-Mar-2023
|
||||||||||||||||||||
City /
|
Country
|
/
|
United
States
|
Vote Deadline
|
26-Apr-2023 11:59 PM ET
|
||||||||||||||||||
SEDOL(s)
|
Quick Code
|
||||||||||||||||||||||
Item
|
Proposal
|
Proposed
by
|
Vote
|
Management
Recommendation
|
For/Against
Management
|
||||||||||||||||||
1.
|
DIRECTOR
|
Management
|
|||||||||||||||||||||
1
|
Timothy J. Donahue
|
Withheld
|
For
|
Against
|
|||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F21 Combined CEO and Board Chair Positions and the Company Earns a Board Score of
Some Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that there is an inherent potential conflict, in having the CEO or former
CEO serve as the Chairman of the Board. Consequently, we prefer that companies focus on the following
areas to improve its corporate governance practices: separate the roles of the Chairman and CEO, hold
annual director elections, have one class of voting stock only, have key board committees consisting of
independent directors and majority of independent directors on board and include non-binding
compensation vote on agenda to further ensure board independence and accountability.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
2
|
Richard H. Fearon
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
|||||||||||||||||||
3
|
Andrea J. Funk
|
Withheld
|
For
|
Against
|
|||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation
score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
4
|
Stephen J. Hagge
|
Withheld
|
For
|
Against
|
|||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation
score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
5
|
Jesse A. Lynn
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
|||||||||||||||||||
6
|
James H. Miller
|
Withheld
|
For
|
Against
|
|||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is
considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit,
Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for
sound corporate governance practice.
F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some
Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
7
|
Josef M. Muller
|
Withheld
|
For
|
Against
|
|||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is
considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit,
Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for
sound corporate governance practice.
F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some
Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
8
|
B. Craig Owens
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
|||||||||||||||||||
9
|
Angela M. Snyder
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
|||||||||||||||||||
10
|
Caesar F. Sweitzer
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
|||||||||||||||||||
11
|
Andrew J. Teno
|
Withheld
|
For
|
Against
|
|||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation
score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
12
|
Marsha C. Williams
|
Withheld
|
For
|
Against
|
|||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation
score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
13
|
Dwayne A. Wilson
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
|||||||||||||||||||
2.
|
Ratification of the appointment of
independent auditors for the fiscal year
ending December 31, 2023.
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor.
Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has
earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, failed to pass our model.
After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that
shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST
this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
3.
|
Approval by advisory vote of the resolution
on executive compensation as described in
the Proxy Statement.
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we
believe that shareholders should support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's
directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered
on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this
Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
4.
|
Approval by advisory vote on the frequency
of future Say-on-Pay votes.
|
Management
|
1 Year
|
1 Year
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
5.
|
Consideration of a Shareholder's proposal
seeking Shareholder ratification of
termination pay.
|
Shareholder
|
For
|
Against
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: We believe that the Company's compensation practices have been and will continue to be a
key factor in the ability to deliver strong results. Furthermore, we believe that adopting the this proposal
would put the Company at a competitive advantage in recruiting and retaining executive talent and that it is
in the best interests of the Company and its stockholders for the independent Compensation Committee to
retain the flexibility to design and administer competitive compensation program. After evaluating the details
pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we
recommend a vote FOR this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
FRANCO-NEVADA CORPORATION
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
Security
|
351858105
|
Meeting Type
|
Annual and Special Meeting
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Ticker Symbol
|
FNV
|
Meeting Date
|
02-May-2023
|
||||||||||||||||||||
ISIN
|
CA3518581051
|
Agenda
|
935800309 - Management
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Record Date
|
14-Mar-2023
|
Holding Recon Date
|
14-Mar-2023
|
||||||||||||||||||||
City /
|
Country
|
/
|
Canada
|
Vote Deadline
|
27-Apr-2023 11:59 PM ET
|
||||||||||||||||||
SEDOL(s)
|
Quick Code
|
||||||||||||||||||||||
Item
|
Proposal
|
Proposed
by
|
Vote
|
Management
Recommendation
|
For/Against
Management
|
||||||||||||||||||
1A
|
Election of Director - David Harquail
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1B
|
Election of Director - Paul Brink
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1C
|
Election of Director - Tom Albanese
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is
considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit,
Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for
sound corporate governance practice.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1D
|
Election of Director - Derek W. Evans
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is
considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit,
Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for
sound corporate governance practice.
F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some
Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1E
|
Election of Director - Catharine Farrow
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1F
|
Election of Director - Maureen Jensen
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation
score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1G
|
Election of Director - Jennifer Maki
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1H
|
Election of Director - Randall Oliphant
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is
considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit,
Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for
sound corporate governance practice.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1I
|
Election of Director - Jacques Perron
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation
score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
2
|
Appointment of PricewaterhouseCoopers
LLP, Chartered Professional Accountants,
as Auditors of the Corporation for the
ensuing year and authorizing the Directors
to fix their remuneration.
|
Management
|
Withheld
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor.
Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has
earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model.
After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that
shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST
this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
3
|
Acceptance of the Corporation's approach
to executive compensation.
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we
believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's
directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not
effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote
AGAINST this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
PROLOGIS, INC.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
Security
|
74340W103
|
Meeting Type
|
Annual
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Ticker Symbol
|
PLD
|
Meeting Date
|
04-May-2023
|
||||||||||||||||||||
ISIN
|
US74340W1036
|
Agenda
|
935786814 - Management
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Record Date
|
07-Mar-2023
|
Holding Recon Date
|
07-Mar-2023
|
||||||||||||||||||||
City /
|
Country
|
/
|
United
States
|
Vote Deadline
|
03-May-2023 11:59 PM ET
|
||||||||||||||||||
SEDOL(s)
|
Quick Code
|
||||||||||||||||||||||
Item
|
Proposal
|
Proposed
by
|
Vote
|
Management
Recommendation
|
For/Against
Management
|
||||||||||||||||||
1a.
|
Election of Director: Hamid R. Moghadam
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F21 Combined CEO and Board Chair Positions and the Company Earns a Board Score
of Some Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that there is an inherent potential conflict in having the CEO or former
CEO serve as the Chairman of the Board. Consequently, we prefer that companies focus on the following
areas to improve its corporate governance practices: separate the roles of the Chairman and CEO, hold
annual director elections, have one class of voting stock only, have key board committees consisting of
independent directors and majority of independent directors on board and include non-binding
compensation vote on agenda to further ensure board independence and accountability.
F22 Chairman of the Board and the Company Earns a Cyber Security Risk Score of Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Chairman of the Board should be held accountable in cases
when the Company obtains the score of Needs Attention on the Cyber Security Risk Score. We believe that
cyber security should be critical for all organizations given the rise of the cyber threats and data breaches in
the corporate scene, which could affect any organization's reputation and lead to declined investor
confidence. As such, Egan-Jones believes that in order to avoid risks of data breaches any cybersecurity
weaknesses should be addressed aggressively in the boardroom, combined with the proper approach to
cyber risk management, implementation of systems and controls against cybersecurity incidents and the
leadership of the Chairman of the Board.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1b.
|
Election of Director: Cristina G. Bita
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1c.
|
Election of Director: James B. Connor
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1d.
|
Election of Director: George L. Fotiades
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is
considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit,
Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors
for sound corporate governance practice.
F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of
Some Concerns or Needs Attention
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1e.
|
Election of Director: Lydia H. Kennard
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1f.
|
Election of Director: Irving F. Lyons III
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1g.
|
Election of Director: Avid Modjtabai
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1h.
|
Election of Director: David P. O'Connor
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation
score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1i.
|
Election of Director: Olivier Piani
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1j.
|
Election of Director: Jeffrey L. Skelton
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is
considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit,
Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors
for sound corporate governance practice.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1k.
|
Election of Director: Carl B. Webb
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is
considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit,
Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors
for sound corporate governance practice.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
2.
|
Advisory Vote to Approve the Company's
Executive Compensation for 2022.
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we
believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's
directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not
effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote
AGAINST this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
3.
|
Advisory Vote on the Frequency of Future
Advisory Votes on the Company's
Executive Compensation.
|
Management
|
1 Year
|
1 Year
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
4.
|
Ratification of the Appointment of KPMG
LLP as the Company's Independent
Registered Public Accounting Firm for the
Year 2023.
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor.
Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has
earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model.
After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that
shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST
this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
Security
|
084670702
|
Meeting Type
|
Annual
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Ticker Symbol
|
BRKB
|
Meeting Date
|
06-May-2023
|
||||||||||||||||||||
ISIN
|
US0846707026
|
Agenda
|
935785418 - Management
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Record Date
|
08-Mar-2023
|
Holding Recon Date
|
08-Mar-2023
|
||||||||||||||||||||
City /
|
Country
|
/
|
United
States
|
Vote Deadline
|
05-May-2023 11:59 PM ET
|
||||||||||||||||||
SEDOL(s)
|
Quick Code
|
||||||||||||||||||||||
Item
|
Proposal
|
Proposed
by
|
Vote
|
Management
Recommendation
|
For/Against
Management
|
||||||||||||||||||
1.
|
DIRECTOR
|
Management
|
|||||||||||||||||||||
1
|
Warren E. Buffett
|
Withheld
|
For
|
Against
|
|||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F21 Combined CEO and Board Chair Positions and the Company Earns a Board Score of
Some Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that there is an inherent potential conflict, in having the CEO or former
CEO serve as the Chairman of the Board. Consequently, we prefer that companies focus on the following
areas to improve its corporate governance practices: separate the roles of the Chairman and CEO, hold
annual director elections, have one class of voting stock only, have key board committees consisting of
independent directors and majority of independent directors on board and include non-binding
compensation vote on agenda to further ensure board independence and accountability.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
2
|
Charles T. Munger
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
|||||||||||||||||||
3
|
Gregory E. Abel
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
|||||||||||||||||||
4
|
Howard G. Buffett
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
|||||||||||||||||||
5
|
Susan A. Buffett
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
|||||||||||||||||||
6
|
Stephen B. Burke
|
Withheld
|
For
|
Against
|
|||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is
considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit,
Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for
sound corporate governance practice.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
7
|
Kenneth I. Chenault
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
|||||||||||||||||||
8
|
Christopher C. Davis
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
|||||||||||||||||||
9
|
Susan L. Decker
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
|||||||||||||||||||
10
|
Charlotte Guyman
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
|||||||||||||||||||
11
|
Ajit Jain
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
|||||||||||||||||||
12
|
Thomas S. Murphy, Jr.
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
|||||||||||||||||||
13
|
Ronald L. Olson
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
|||||||||||||||||||
14
|
Wallace R. Weitz
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
|||||||||||||||||||
15
|
Meryl B. Witmer
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
|||||||||||||||||||
2.
|
Non-binding resolution to approve the
compensation of the Company's Named
Executive Officers, as described in the 2023
Proxy Statement.
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
3.
|
Non-binding resolution to determine the
frequency (whether annual, biennial or
triennial) with which shareholders of the
Company shall be entitled to have an
advisory vote on executive compensation.
|
Management
|
1 Year
|
3 Years
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: It is our opinion that an annual say-on-pay vote is the accepted standard for companies today
and a requirement for good corporate governance. Furthermore, we believe that triennial advisory vote on
executive compensation will hinder shareholders from providing the Company with direct input on their
respective compensation philosophy, policies and practices as disclosed in the proxy statement. We do not
concur with the current board's recommendation of a triennial ratification (non-binding vote) on this issue.
We recommend a vote AGAINST the option of triennial (every three years) as the frequency with which
shareholders will be provided an advisory vote on executive compensation.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
4.
|
Shareholder proposal regarding how the
Company manages physical and
transitional climate related risks and
opportunities.
|
Shareholder
|
For
|
Against
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: We believe that the report on climate change will develop new methods that can be applied
globally when sufficient observations exist. Acknowledging climate change as an inevitable factor, and
recognizing the need to adapt, involves bold decisions by business. Therefore, we believe that companies
should review how climate change impacts the economy and portfolio companies and evaluate how
shareholder resolutions on climate change may impact long-term shareholder value as it votes proxies.
After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones'
Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
5.
|
Shareholder proposal regarding how
climate related risks are being governed by
the Company.
|
Shareholder
|
For
|
Against
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: We believe that the report on climate change will develop new methods that can be applied
globally when sufficient observations exist. Acknowledging climate change as an inevitable factor, and
recognizing the need to adapt, involves bold decisions by business. Therefore, we believe that companies
should review how climate change impacts the economy and portfolio companies and evaluate how
shareholder resolutions on climate change may impact long-term shareholder value as it votes proxies.
After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones'
Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
6.
|
Shareholder proposal regarding how the
Company intends to measure, disclose and
reduce GHG emissions associated with its
underwriting, insuring and investment
activities.
|
Shareholder
|
For
|
Against
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: We believe that setting clear-cut goals will help the Company reduce its regulatory risk related
to GHG emissions, financial risk by decreasing volatility of energy prices, and overall expenditure on energy
by implementing a disciplined business strategy to cut emissions from its operations. We believe that the
proposal warrants shareholder approval. Here, we find that approval of the proposal will provide the
transparency shareholders need to evaluate such activities. After evaluating the details pursuant to the
shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this
Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
7.
|
Shareholder proposal regarding the
reporting on the effectiveness of the
Corporation's diversity, equity and inclusion
efforts.
|
Shareholder
|
For
|
Against
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: We believe that the proposal warrants shareholder approval. We believe that the proposal
would encourage good governance and enhance shareholder value by bringing together a diverse range of
skills and experience necessary in building a constructive and challenging workforce. After evaluating the
details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we
recommend a vote FOR this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
8.
|
Shareholder proposal regarding the
adoption of a policy requiring that two
separate people hold the offices of the
Chairman and the CEO.
|
Shareholder
|
For
|
Against
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: We believe that there is an inherent potential conflict, in having an Inside director serve as the
Chairman of the board. Consequently, we prefer that companies separate the roles of the Chairman and
CEO and that the Chairman be independent to further ensure board independence and accountability. After
evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy
Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
9.
|
Shareholder proposal requesting that the
Company avoid supporting or taking a
public policy position on controversial social
and political issues.
|
Shareholder
|
Against
|
Against
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: We believe that approval of the proposal is not in the best interests of the Company and its
shareholders. We recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
DANAHER CORPORATION
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
Security
|
235851102
|
Meeting Type
|
Annual
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Ticker Symbol
|
DHR
|
Meeting Date
|
09-May-2023
|
||||||||||||||||||||
ISIN
|
US2358511028
|
Agenda
|
935795510 - Management
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Record Date
|
10-Mar-2023
|
Holding Recon Date
|
10-Mar-2023
|
||||||||||||||||||||
City /
|
Country
|
/
|
United
States
|
Vote Deadline
|
08-May-2023 11:59 PM ET
|
||||||||||||||||||
SEDOL(s)
|
Quick Code
|
||||||||||||||||||||||
Item
|
Proposal
|
Proposed
by
|
Vote
|
Management
Recommendation
|
For/Against
Management
|
||||||||||||||||||
1a.
|
Election of Director to hold office until the
2024 Annual Meeting of Shareholders:
Rainer M. Blair
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1b.
|
Election of Director to hold office until the
2024 Annual Meeting of Shareholders:
Feroz Dewan
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1c.
|
Election of Director to hold office until the
2024 Annual Meeting of Shareholders:
Linda Filler
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1d.
|
Election of Director to hold office until the
2024 Annual Meeting of Shareholders: Teri
List
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation
score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1e.
|
Election of Director to hold office until the
2024 Annual Meeting of Shareholders:
Walter G. Lohr, Jr.
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is
considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit,
Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors
for sound corporate governance practice.
F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of
Some Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1f.
|
Election of Director to hold office until the
2024 Annual Meeting of Shareholders:
Jessica L. Mega, MD, MPH
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation
score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1g.
|
Election of Director to hold office until the
2024 Annual Meeting of Shareholders:
Mitchell P. Rales
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1h.
|
Election of Director to hold office until the
2024 Annual Meeting of Shareholders:
Steven M. Rales
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1i.
|
Election of Director to hold office until the
2024 Annual Meeting of Shareholders:
Pardis C. Sabeti, MD, D. PHIL
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1j.
|
Election of Director to hold office until the
2024 Annual Meeting of Shareholders: A.
Shane Sanders
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1k.
|
Election of Director to hold office until the
2024 Annual Meeting of Shareholders: John
T. Schwieters
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is
considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit,
Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors
for sound corporate governance practice.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1l.
|
Election of Director to hold office until the
2024 Annual Meeting of Shareholders: Alan
G. Spoon
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is
considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit,
Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors
for sound corporate governance practice.
F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of
Some Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1m.
|
Election of Director to hold office until the
2024 Annual Meeting of Shareholders:
Raymond C. Stevens, Ph.D
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1n.
|
Election of Director to hold office until the
2024 Annual Meeting of Shareholders: Elias
A. Zerhouni, MD
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
2.
|
To ratify the selection of Ernst & Young LLP
as Danaher's independent registered public
accounting firm for the year ending
December 31, 2023.
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor.
Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has
earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model.
After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that
shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST
this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
3.
|
To approve on an advisory basis the
Company's named executive officer
compensation.
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we
believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's
directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not
effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote
AGAINST this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
4.
|
To hold an advisory vote relating to the
frequency of future shareholder advisory
votes on the Company's executive officer
compensation.
|
Management
|
1 Year
|
1 Year
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
5.
|
To act upon a shareholder proposal
requesting adoption of a policy separating
the chair and CEO roles and requiring an
independent Board Chair whenever
possible.
|
Shareholder
|
For
|
Against
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: We believe that there is an inherent potential conflict in having an Inside director serve as the
Chairman of the board. Consequently, we prefer that companies separate the roles of the Chairman and
CEO and that the Chairman be independent to further ensure board independence and accountability. After
evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy
Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
6.
|
To act upon a shareholder proposal
requesting a report to shareholders on the
effectiveness of the Company's diversity,
equity and inclusion efforts.
|
Shareholder
|
For
|
Against
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: We believe that a company's success depends upon its ability to embrace diversity and to draw
upon the skills, expertise, and experience of its workforce. As such, we believe that adoption of this
proposal is in the best interests of the Company and its shareholders. As such, we recommend a vote FOR
this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
JPMORGAN CHASE & CO.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
Security
|
46625H100
|
Meeting Type
|
Annual
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Ticker Symbol
|
JPM
|
Meeting Date
|
16-May-2023
|
||||||||||||||||||||
ISIN
|
US46625H1005
|
Agenda
|
935797223 - Management
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Record Date
|
17-Mar-2023
|
Holding Recon Date
|
17-Mar-2023
|
||||||||||||||||||||
City /
|
Country
|
/
|
United
States
|
Vote Deadline
|
15-May-2023 11:59 PM ET
|
||||||||||||||||||
SEDOL(s)
|
Quick Code
|
||||||||||||||||||||||
Item
|
Proposal
|
Proposed
by
|
Vote
|
Management
Recommendation
|
For/Against
Management
|
||||||||||||||||||
1a.
|
Election of Director: Linda B. Bammann
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation
score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1b.
|
Election of Director: Stephen B. Burke
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is
considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit,
Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors
for sound corporate governance practice.
F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of
Some Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1c.
|
Election of Director: Todd A. Combs
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation
score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1d.
|
Election of Director: James S. Crown
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1e.
|
Election of Director: Alicia Boler Davis
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1f.
|
Election of Director: James Dimon
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F21 Combined CEO and Board Chair Positions and the Company Earns a Board Score
of Some Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that there is an inherent potential conflict in having the CEO or former
CEO serve as the Chairman of the Board. Consequently, we prefer that companies focus on the following
areas to improve its corporate governance practices: separate the roles of the Chairman and CEO, hold
annual director elections, have one class of voting stock only, have key board committees consisting of
independent directors and majority of independent directors on board and include non-binding
compensation vote on agenda to further ensure board independence and accountability.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1g.
|
Election of Director: Timothy P. Flynn
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is
considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit,
Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors
for sound corporate governance practice.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1h.
|
Election of Director: Alex Gorsky
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1i.
|
Election of Director: Mellody Hobson
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1j.
|
Election of Director: Michael A. Neal
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1k.
|
Election of Director: Phebe N. Novakovic
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1l.
|
Election of Director: Virginia M. Rometty
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation
score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
2.
|
Advisory resolution to approve executive
compensation
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we
believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's
directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not
effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote
AGAINST this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
3.
|
Advisory vote on frequency of advisory
resolution to approve executive
compensation
|
Management
|
1 Year
|
1 Year
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
4.
|
Ratification of independent registered public
accounting firm
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor.
Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has
earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model.
After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that
shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST
this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
5.
|
Independent board chairman
|
Shareholder
|
For
|
Against
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: We believe that there is an inherent potential conflict in having an Inside director serve as the
Chairman of the board. Consequently, we prefer that companies separate the roles of the Chairman and
CEO and that the Chairman be independent to further ensure board independence and accountability. After
evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy
Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
6.
|
Fossil fuel phase out
|
Shareholder
|
Against
|
Against
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: We do not believe that the expenditure of the additional human and financial resources that
would be required to adopt this proposal would be a necessary or prudent use of Company and shareholder
assets. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-
Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
7.
|
Amending public responsibility committee
charter to include mandate to oversee
animal welfare impact and risk
|
Shareholder
|
Against
|
Against
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: We believe that the proposal is not necessary and is not in the best long-term interest of the
Company and its shareholders. As such, in accordance with Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend
a vote AGAINST this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
8.
|
Special shareholder meeting improvement
|
Shareholder
|
For
|
Against
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: We believe that this proposal is consistent with best corporate governance practices and in the
best interests of the shareholders to permit holders of at least 10% or more of the Company's outstanding
shares of common stock to call special meetings of shareholders. After evaluating the details pursuant to
the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote
FOR this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
9.
|
Report on climate transition planning
|
Shareholder
|
For
|
Against
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: Climate change is one of the most financially significant environmental issues currently facing
investors. Data on occupational safety and health, vendor and labor standards, waste and water reduction
targets and product-related environmental impacts are important business considerations. Not managing
these properly could pose significant regulatory, legal, reputational and financial risks. Tracking and
reporting on ESG business practices makes a company more responsive to a global business environment
which is characterized by finite natural resources, changing legislation, and heightened public expectations
for corporate accountability. Reporting also helps companies better integrate and gain strategic value from
existing sustainability efforts, identify gaps and opportunities in products and processes, develop company-
wide communications, publicize innovative practices, and receive feedback. We believe that approval of this
proposal is in the best interests of the Company and its shareholders. After evaluating the details pursuant
to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a
vote FOR this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
10.
|
Report on ensuring respect for civil liberties
|
Shareholder
|
For
|
Against
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: We believe that the proposal warrants shareholder approval. Here, we find that approval of the
proposal will provide the transparency shareholders need to evaluate such activities. After evaluating the
details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Guidelines, we
recommend a vote FOR this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
11.
|
Report analyzing the congruence of the
company's political and electioneering
expenditures
|
Shareholder
|
Against
|
Against
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: In light of the Company's policies and oversight mechanisms related to its political contributions
and activities, we believe that the shareholder proposal is unnecessary and will not result in any additional
benefit to the shareholders. Rather, the proposal promotes impractical and imprudent actions that would
negatively affect the business and results. We recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
12.
|
Absolute GHG reduction goals
|
Shareholder
|
For
|
Against
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: We believe that setting clear-cut goals will help the Company reduce its regulatory risk related
to GHG emissions, financial risk by decreasing volatility of energy prices, and overall expenditure on energy
by implementing a disciplined business strategy to cut emissions from its operations. After evaluating the
details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we
recommend a vote FOR this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
FISERV, INC.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
Security
|
337738108
|
Meeting Type
|
Annual
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Ticker Symbol
|
FISV
|
Meeting Date
|
17-May-2023
|
||||||||||||||||||||
ISIN
|
US3377381088
|
Agenda
|
935806096 - Management
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Record Date
|
20-Mar-2023
|
Holding Recon Date
|
20-Mar-2023
|
||||||||||||||||||||
City /
|
Country
|
/
|
United
States
|
Vote Deadline
|
16-May-2023 11:59 PM ET
|
||||||||||||||||||
SEDOL(s)
|
Quick Code
|
||||||||||||||||||||||
Item
|
Proposal
|
Proposed
by
|
Vote
|
Management
Recommendation
|
For/Against
Management
|
||||||||||||||||||
1.
|
DIRECTOR
|
Management
|
|||||||||||||||||||||
1
|
Frank J. Bisignano
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
|||||||||||||||||||
2
|
Henrique de Castro
|
Withheld
|
For
|
Against
|
|||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation
score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
3
|
Harry F. DiSimone
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
|||||||||||||||||||
4
|
Dylan G. Haggart
|
Withheld
|
For
|
Against
|
|||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation
score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
5
|
Wafaa Mamilli
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
|||||||||||||||||||
6
|
Heidi G. Miller
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
|||||||||||||||||||
7
|
Doyle R. Simons
|
Withheld
|
For
|
Against
|
|||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is
considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit,
Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors
for sound corporate governance practice.
F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of
Some Concerns or Needs Attention
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
8
|
Kevin M. Warren
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
|||||||||||||||||||
2.
|
To approve, on an advisory basis, the
compensation of the named executive
officers of Fiserv, Inc.
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we
believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's
directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not
effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote
AGAINST this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
3.
|
Advisory vote on the frequency of advisory
votes on the compensation of the named
executive officers of Fiserv, Inc.
|
Management
|
1 Year
|
1 Year
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
4.
|
To ratify the appointment of Deloitte &
Touche LLP as the independent registered
public accounting firm of Fiserv, Inc. for
2023.
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor.
Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has
earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model.
After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that
shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST
this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
5.
|
Shareholder proposal requesting an
independent board chair policy.
|
Shareholder
|
For
|
Against
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: Chairman be independent to further ensure board independence and accountability. After
evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy
Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
MONDELEZ INTERNATIONAL, INC.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
Security
|
609207105
|
Meeting Type
|
Annual
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Ticker Symbol
|
MDLZ
|
Meeting Date
|
17-May-2023
|
||||||||||||||||||||
ISIN
|
US6092071058
|
Agenda
|
935809357 - Management
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Record Date
|
08-Mar-2023
|
Holding Recon Date
|
08-Mar-2023
|
||||||||||||||||||||
City /
|
Country
|
/
|
United
States
|
Vote Deadline
|
16-May-2023 11:59 PM ET
|
||||||||||||||||||
SEDOL(s)
|
Quick Code
|
||||||||||||||||||||||
Item
|
Proposal
|
Proposed
by
|
Vote
|
Management
Recommendation
|
For/Against
Management
|
||||||||||||||||||
1a.
|
Election of Director: Lewis W.K. Booth
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is
considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit,
Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors
for sound corporate governance practice.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1b.
|
Election of Director: Charles E. Bunch
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1c.
|
Election of Director: Ertharin Cousin
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1d.
|
Election of Director: Jorge S. Mesquita
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board Committee
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is
considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit,
Compensation, and Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors
for sound corporate governance practice.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1e.
|
Election of Director: Anindita Mukherjee
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1f.
|
Election of Director: Jane Hamilton Nielsen
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1g.
|
Election of Director: Patrick T. Siewert
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F10 Affiliation - Ex-Officio - Member of a Key Board Committee
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, a director who serves on the Company board in an ex-officio
capacity is considered affiliated. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation, and
Nominating Committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate
governance practice.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1h.
|
Election of Director: Michael A. Todman
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1i.
|
Election of Director: Dirk Van de Put
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F21 Combined CEO and Board Chair Positions and the Company Earns a Board Score
of Some Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that there is an inherent potential conflict in having the CEO or former
CEO serve as the Chairman of the Board. Consequently, we prefer that companies focus on the following
areas to improve its corporate governance practices: separate the roles of the Chairman and CEO, hold
annual director elections, have one class of voting stock only, have key board committees consisting of
independent directors and majority of independent directors on board and include non-binding
compensation vote on agenda to further ensure board independence and accountability.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
2.
|
Advisory Vote to Approve Executive
Compensation.
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
3.
|
Advisory Vote on the Frequency of Future
Votes to Approve Executive Compensation.
|
Management
|
1 Year
|
1 Year
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
4.
|
Ratification of the Selection of
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP as
Independent Registered Public Accountants
for Fiscal Year Ending December 31, 2023.
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor.
Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has
earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model.
After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that
shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST
this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
5.
|
Require Independent Chair of the Board.
|
Shareholder
|
For
|
Against
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: We believe that there is an inherent potential conflict in having an Inside director serve as the
Chairman of the board. Consequently, we prefer that companies separate the roles of the Chairman and
CEO and that the Chairman be independent to further ensure board independence and accountability. After
evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy
Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
6.
|
Publish Annual Benchmarks for Achieving
Company's 2025 Cage-Free Egg Goal.
|
Shareholder
|
Against
|
Against
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: We believe that the preparation of an additional report to stockholders as requested by the
proponent would not be a good use of company resources. As such, in accordance with Egan-Jones' Proxy
Guidelines, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
7.
|
Adopt Public Targets to Eradicate Child
Labor in Cocoa Supply Chain
|
Shareholder
|
For
|
Against
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: We believe that transparency is important for evaluating risks and ensuring that investors and
stakeholders have adequate information necessary to make informed decisions. In accordance with Egan-
Jones' Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
CHUBB LIMITED
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
Security
|
H1467J104
|
Meeting Type
|
Annual
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Ticker Symbol
|
CB
|
Meeting Date
|
17-May-2023
|
||||||||||||||||||||
ISIN
|
CH0044328745
|
Agenda
|
935813027 - Management
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Record Date
|
24-Mar-2023
|
Holding Recon Date
|
24-Mar-2023
|
||||||||||||||||||||
City /
|
Country
|
/
|
United
States
|
Vote Deadline
|
15-May-2023 11:59 PM ET
|
||||||||||||||||||
SEDOL(s)
|
Quick Code
|
||||||||||||||||||||||
Item
|
Proposal
|
Proposed
by
|
Vote
|
Management
Recommendation
|
For/Against
Management
|
||||||||||||||||||
1
|
Approval of the management report,
standalone financial statements and
consolidated financial statements of Chubb
Limited for the year ended December 31,
2022
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
2a
|
Allocation of disposable profit
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
2b
|
Distribution of a dividend out of legal
reserves (by way of release and allocation
to a dividend reserve)
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
3
|
Discharge of the Board of Directors
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
4a
|
Election of PricewaterhouseCoopers AG
(Zurich) as our statutory auditor
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor.
Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has
earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model.
After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that
shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST
this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
4b
|
Ratification of appointment of
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP (United
States) as independent registered public
accounting firm for purposes of U.S.
securities law reporting
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor.
Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has
earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model.
After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that
shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST
this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
4c
|
Election of BDO AG (Zurich) as special
audit firm
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
5a
|
Election of Director: Evan G. Greenberg
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: Combined CEO and Board Chair positions and the Company earns a board score of Some
Concerns
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that there is an inherent potential conflict, in having the CEO or former
CEO serve as the Chairman of the Board. Consequently, we prefer that companies focus on the following
areas to improve its corporate governance practices: separate the roles of the Chairman and CEO, hold
annual director elections, have one class of voting stock only, have key board committees consisting of
independent directors and majority of independent directors on board and include non-binding
compensation vote on agenda to further ensure board independence and accountability.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
5b
|
Election of Director: Michael P. Connors
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: Affiliated Outside director serving as a member of the Compensation and Nominating
Committees
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is
considered affiliated, with the exception of diverse nominees.
We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be
comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
5c
|
Election of Director: Michael G. Atieh
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
5d
|
Election of Director: Kathy Bonanno
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
5e
|
Election of Director: Nancy K. Buese
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
5f
|
Election of Director: Sheila P. Burke
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
5g
|
Election of Director: Michael L. Corbat
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
5h
|
Election of Director: Robert J. Hugin
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
5i
|
Election of Director: Robert W. Scully
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
5j
|
Election of Director: Theodore E. Shasta
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: Affiliated Outside director serving as a member of the Audit Committee
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is
considered affiliated, with the exception of diverse nominees.
We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be
comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
5k
|
Election of Director: David H. Sidwell
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
5l
|
Election of Director: Olivier Steimer
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
5m
|
Election of Director: Frances F. Townsend
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
6
|
Election of Evan G. Greenberg as
Chairman of the Board of Directors
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: Combined CEO and Board Chair positions and the Company earns a board score of Some
Concerns
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that there is an inherent potential conflict, in having the CEO or former
CEO serve as the Chairman of the Board. Consequently, we prefer that companies focus on the following
areas to improve its corporate governance practices: separate the roles of the Chairman and CEO, hold
annual director elections, have one class of voting stock only, have key board committees consisting of
independent directors and majority of independent directors on board and include non-binding
compensation vote on agenda to further ensure board independence and accountability
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
7a
|
Election of the Compensation Committee of
the Board of Directors: Michael P. Connors
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: Affiliated Outside director serving as a member of the Compensation and Nominating
Committees
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is
considered affiliated, with the exception of diverse nominees.
We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be
comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
7b
|
Election of the Compensation Committee of
the Board of Directors: David H. Sidwell
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
7c
|
Election of the Compensation Committee of
the Board of Directors: Frances F.
Townsend
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
8
|
Election of Homburger AG as independent
proxy
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
9a
|
Amendments to the Articles of Association:
Amendments relating to Swiss corporate
law updates
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
9b
|
Amendments to the Articles of Association:
Amendment to advance notice period
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
10a
|
Reduction of share capital: Cancellation of
repurchased shares
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
10b
|
Reduction of share capital: Par value
reduction
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
11a
|
Approval of the compensation of the Board
of Directors and Executive Management
under Swiss law requirements: Maximum
compensation of the Board of Directors until
the next annual general meeting
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
11b
|
Approval of the compensation of the Board
of Directors and Executive Management
under Swiss law requirements: Maximum
compensation of Executive Management for
the 2024 calendar year
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
11c
|
Approval of the compensation of the Board
of Directors and Executive Management
under Swiss law requirements: Advisory
vote to approve the Swiss compensation
report
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
12
|
Advisory vote to approve executive
compensation under U.S. securities law
requirements
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
13
|
Advisory vote on the frequency of the U.S.
securities law advisory vote on executive
compensation
|
Management
|
1 Year
|
1 Year
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
14
|
Shareholder proposal on greenhouse gas
emissions targets, if properly presented
|
Shareholder
|
For
|
Against
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: Acknowledging climate change as an inevitable factor, and recognizing the need to adapt,
involves bold decisions by business. Therefore, we believe that companies should review how climate
change impacts the economy and portfolio companies and evaluate how shareholder resolutions on climate
change may impact long-term shareholder value as it votes proxies. After evaluating the details pursuant to
the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote
FOR this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
15
|
Shareholder proposal on human rights and
underwriting, if properly presented.
|
Shareholder
|
For
|
Against
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: We believe that the proposal warrants shareholder approval. Here, we find that approval of the
proposal will provide the transparency shareholders need to evaluate such activities. After evaluating the
details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Guidelines, we
recommend a vote FOR this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
A
|
If a new agenda item or a new proposal for
an existing agenda item is put before the
meeting, I/we hereby authorize and instruct
the independent proxy to vote as follows.
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: We do not recommend that shareholders approve in advance matters of which they have no
knowledge. Accordingly, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
INTERCONTINENTAL EXCHANGE, INC.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
Security
|
45866F104
|
Meeting Type
|
Annual
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Ticker Symbol
|
ICE
|
Meeting Date
|
19-May-2023
|
||||||||||||||||||||
ISIN
|
US45866F1049
|
Agenda
|
935812621 - Management
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Record Date
|
21-Mar-2023
|
Holding Recon Date
|
21-Mar-2023
|
||||||||||||||||||||
City /
|
Country
|
/
|
United
States
|
Vote Deadline
|
18-May-2023 11:59 PM ET
|
||||||||||||||||||
SEDOL(s)
|
Quick Code
|
||||||||||||||||||||||
Item
|
Proposal
|
Proposed
by
|
Vote
|
Management
Recommendation
|
For/Against
Management
|
||||||||||||||||||
1a.
|
Election of Director for terms expiring in
2024: Hon. Sharon Y. Bowen
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1b.
|
Election of Director for terms expiring in
2024: Shantella E. Cooper
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation
score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1c.
|
Election of Director for terms expiring in
2024: Duriya M. Farooqui
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1d.
|
Election of Director for terms expiring in
2024: The Rt. Hon. the Lord Hague of
Richmond
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation
score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1e.
|
Election of Director for terms expiring in
2024: Mark F. Mulhern
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation
score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1f.
|
Election of Director for terms expiring in
2024: Thomas E. Noonan
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1g.
|
Election of Director for terms expiring in
2024: Caroline L. Silver
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1h.
|
Election of Director for terms expiring in
2024: Jeffrey C. Sprecher
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1i.
|
Election of Director for terms expiring in
2024: Judith A. Sprieser
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1j.
|
Election of Director for terms expiring in
2024: Martha A. Tirinnanzi
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
2.
|
To approve, by non-binding vote, the
advisory resolution on executive
compensation for named executive officers.
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we
believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's
directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not
effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote
AGAINST this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
3.
|
To approve, by non-binding vote, the
advisory resolution to approve the
frequency of future advisory votes on
executive compensation.
|
Management
|
1 Year
|
1 Year
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
4.
|
To ratify the appointment of Ernst & Young
LLP as our independent registered public
accounting firm for the fiscal year ending
December 31, 2023.
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor.
Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has
earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model.
After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that
shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST
this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
5.
|
A stockholder proposal regarding special
stockholder meeting improvement, if
properly presented at the Annual Meeting.
|
Shareholder
|
For
|
Against
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: We believe that this proposal is consistent with best corporate governance practices and in the
best interests of the shareholders to permit holders of at least 10% or more of the Company's outstanding
shares of common stock to call special meetings of shareholders. After evaluating the details pursuant to
the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote
FOR this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
RESTAURANT BRANDS INTERNATIONAL INC.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
Security
|
76131D103
|
Meeting Type
|
Annual
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Ticker Symbol
|
QSR
|
Meeting Date
|
23-May-2023
|
||||||||||||||||||||
ISIN
|
CA76131D1033
|
Agenda
|
935817722 - Management
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Record Date
|
28-Mar-2023
|
Holding Recon Date
|
28-Mar-2023
|
||||||||||||||||||||
City /
|
Country
|
/
|
United
States
|
Vote Deadline
|
18-May-2023 11:59 PM ET
|
||||||||||||||||||
SEDOL(s)
|
Quick Code
|
||||||||||||||||||||||
Item
|
Proposal
|
Proposed
by
|
Vote
|
Management
Recommendation
|
For/Against
Management
|
||||||||||||||||||
1a.
|
Election of Director: Alexandre Behring
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some
Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for
such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are
centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its
shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the
Company's long-term success, and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes
that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a
whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly, as well as link that pay with the
performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be
proposed in the future.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1b.
|
Election of Director: Maximilien de Limburg
Stirum
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1c.
|
Election of Director: J. Patrick Doyle
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1d.
|
Election of Director: Cristina Farjallat
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1e.
|
Election of Director: Jordana Fribourg
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1f.
|
Election of Director: Ali Hedayat
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1g.
|
Election of Director: Marc Lemann
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1h.
|
Election of Director: Jason Melbourne
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1i.
|
Election of Director: Daniel S. Schwartz
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1j.
|
Election of Director: Thecla Sweeney
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
2.
|
Say-On-Pay: Approval, on a non-binding
advisory basis, of the compensation paid to
named executive officers.
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we
believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's
directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not
effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote
AGAINST this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
3.
|
Appointment of Auditors: Appoint KPMG
LLP as our auditors to serve until the close
of the 2024 Annual General Meeting of
Shareholders and authorize our directors to
fix the auditors' remuneration
|
Management
|
Withheld
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor.
Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral. This audit firm has earned a
grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model.
After, taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that
shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST
this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
4.
|
2023 Omnibus Incentive Plan: Approval of
2023 Omnibus Incentive Plan.
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: After taking into account the maximum amount of shareholder equity dilution this proposal could
cause, as well as both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that
shareholders should not support the passage of this plan as proposed by the board of directors. We
recommend the board seek to align CEO pay more closely with the performance of the company and work
to reduce the cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. Therefore, we recommend a vote
AGAINST this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
5.
|
Shareholder Proposal: Consider a
shareholder proposal regarding annual
glidepath ESG disclosure.
|
Shareholder
|
Against
|
Against
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: We believe that the proposal is not necessary and is not in the best long-term interest of the
Company and its shareholders. As such, in accordance with Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend
a vote AGAINST this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
6.
|
Shareholder Proposal: Consider a
shareholder proposal regarding the
Company's report on lobbying activities and
expenditures.
|
Shareholder
|
Against
|
Against
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: We believe that it is in the best interests of the Company and the stockholders to belong to
industry associations and coalitions, where the Company benefits from the general business, technical, and
industry standard-setting expertise these organizations provide. We furthermore believe that the proposal
seeks unnecessary line-item disclosure of lobbying expenditures. We believe that the requested report is
unnecessary and would require expenditures and the use of Company resources without providing any
meaningful benefit to the shareholders. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal
and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
7.
|
Shareholder Proposal: Consider a
shareholder proposal to report on the
Company's business strategy in the face of
labour market pressure.
|
Shareholder
|
For
|
Against
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
8.
|
Shareholder Proposal: Consider a
shareholder proposal to report on reduction
of plastics use.
|
Shareholder
|
Against
|
Against
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: We believe that the approval of this proposal would result in the Company incurring
unnecessary costs and expenses by duplicating efforts that are already underway and providing additional
reports with information that is already available to shareholders. In accordance to Egan-Jones Proxy
Guidelines, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
THERMO FISHER SCIENTIFIC INC.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
Security
|
883556102
|
Meeting Type
|
Annual
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Ticker Symbol
|
TMO
|
Meeting Date
|
24-May-2023
|
||||||||||||||||||||
ISIN
|
US8835561023
|
Agenda
|
935803709 - Management
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Record Date
|
27-Mar-2023
|
Holding Recon Date
|
27-Mar-2023
|
||||||||||||||||||||
City /
|
Country
|
/
|
United
States
|
Vote Deadline
|
23-May-2023 11:59 PM ET
|
||||||||||||||||||
SEDOL(s)
|
Quick Code
|
||||||||||||||||||||||
Item
|
Proposal
|
Proposed
by
|
Vote
|
Management
Recommendation
|
For/Against
Management
|
||||||||||||||||||
1a.
|
Election of Director: Marc N. Casper
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F22 Chairman of the Board and the Company Earns a Cyber Security Risk Score of
Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Chairman of the Board should be held accountable in cases
when the Company obtains the score of Needs Attention on the Cyber Security Risk Score. We believe that
cyber security should be critical for all organizations given the rise of the cyber threats and data breaches in
the corporate scene, which could affect any organization's reputation and lead to declined investor
confidence. As such, Egan-Jones believes that in order to avoid risks of data breaches any cybersecurity
weaknesses should be addressed aggressively in the board room, combined with the proper approach to
cyber risk management, implementation of systems and controls against cybersecurity incidents and the
leadership of the Chairman of the Board.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1b.
|
Election of Director: Nelson J. Chai
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1c.
|
Election of Director: Ruby R. Chandy
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1d.
|
Election of Director: C. Martin Harris
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1e.
|
Election of Director: Tyler Jacks
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1f.
|
Election of Director: R. Alexandra Keith
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some
Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for
such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are
centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its
shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the
Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes
that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a
whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the
performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be
proposed in the future.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1g.
|
Election of Director: James C. Mullen
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1h.
|
Election of Director: Lars R. Sørensen
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1i.
|
Election of Director: Debora L. Spar
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1j.
|
Election of Director: Scott M. Sperling
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is
considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit,
Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for
sound corporate governance practice.
F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs
Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for
such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are
centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its
shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the
Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes
that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a
whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the
performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be
proposed in the future.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1k.
|
Election of Director: Dion J. Weisler
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some
Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for
such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are
centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its
shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the
Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes
that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a
whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the
performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be
proposed in the future.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
2.
|
An advisory vote to approve named
executive officer compensation.
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we
believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's
directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not
effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote
AGAINST this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
3.
|
An advisory vote on the frequency of future
named executive officer advisory votes.
|
Management
|
1 Year
|
1 Year
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
4.
|
Ratification of the Audit Committee's
selection of PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP
as the Company's independent auditors for
2023.
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor.
Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has
earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model.
After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that
shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST
this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
5.
|
Approval of the Company's Amended and
Restated 2013 Stock Incentive Plan.
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: After taking into account the maximum amount of shareholder equity dilution this proposal could
cause, as well as both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that
shareholders should not support the passage of this plan as proposed by the board of directors. We
recommend the board seek to align CEO pay more closely with the performance of the company and work
to reduce the cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. Therefore, we recommend a vote
AGAINST this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
6.
|
Approval of the Company's 2023 Global
Employee Stock Purchase Plan.
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
FIDELITY NAT'L INFORMATION SERVICES,INC.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
Security
|
31620M106
|
Meeting Type
|
Annual
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Ticker Symbol
|
FIS
|
Meeting Date
|
24-May-2023
|
||||||||||||||||||||
ISIN
|
US31620M1062
|
Agenda
|
935815184 - Management
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Record Date
|
31-Mar-2023
|
Holding Recon Date
|
31-Mar-2023
|
||||||||||||||||||||
City /
|
Country
|
/
|
United
States
|
Vote Deadline
|
23-May-2023 11:59 PM ET
|
||||||||||||||||||
SEDOL(s)
|
Quick Code
|
||||||||||||||||||||||
Item
|
Proposal
|
Proposed
by
|
Vote
|
Management
Recommendation
|
For/Against
Management
|
||||||||||||||||||
1a.
|
Election of Director: Lee Adrean
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1b.
|
Election of Director: Ellen R. Alemany
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1c.
|
Election of Director: Mark D. Benjamin
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1d.
|
Election of Director: Vijay G. D'Silva
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1e.
|
Election of Director: Stephanie L. Ferris
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1f.
|
Election of Director: Jeffrey A. Goldstein
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation
score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1g.
|
Election of Director: Lisa A. Hook
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1h.
|
Election of Director: Kenneth T. Lamneck
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation
score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1i.
|
Election of Director: Gary L. Lauer
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation
score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1j.
|
Election of Director: Louise M. Parent
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1k.
|
Election of Director: Brian T. Shea
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1l.
|
Election of Director: James B. Stallings, Jr.
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation
score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
2.
|
To approve, on an advisory basis, the
compensation of the Company's named
executive officers.
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we
believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's
directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not
effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote
AGAINST this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
3.
|
To approve, on an advisory basis, the
preferred frequency of stockholder advisory
votes on executive compensation.
|
Management
|
1 Year
|
1 Year
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
4.
|
To ratify the appointment of KPMG LLP as
the Company's independent registered
public accounting firm for 2023.
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor.
Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has
earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model.
After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that
shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST
this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
ALPHABET INC.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
Security
|
02079K305
|
Meeting Type
|
Annual
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Ticker Symbol
|
GOOGL
|
Meeting Date
|
02-Jun-2023
|
||||||||||||||||||||
ISIN
|
US02079K3059
|
Agenda
|
935830946 - Management
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Record Date
|
04-Apr-2023
|
Holding Recon Date
|
04-Apr-2023
|
||||||||||||||||||||
City /
|
Country
|
/
|
United
States
|
Vote Deadline
|
01-Jun-2023 11:59 PM ET
|
||||||||||||||||||
SEDOL(s)
|
Quick Code
|
||||||||||||||||||||||
Item
|
Proposal
|
Proposed
by
|
Vote
|
Management
Recommendation
|
For/Against
Management
|
||||||||||||||||||
1a.
|
Election of Director: Larry Page
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1b.
|
Election of Director: Sergey Brin
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1c.
|
Election of Director: Sundar Pichai
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1d.
|
Election of Director: John L. Hennessy
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is
considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit,
Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for
sound corporate governance practice.
F22 Chairman of the Board and the Company Earns a Cyber Security Risk Score of Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Chairman of the Board should be held accountable in cases
when the Company obtains the score of Needs Attention on the Cyber Security Risk Score. We believe that
cyber security should be critical for all organizations given the rise of the cyber threats and data breaches in
the corporate scene, which could affect any organization's reputation and lead to declined investor
confidence. As such, Egan-Jones believes that in order to avoid risks of data breaches any cybersecurity
weaknesses should be addressed aggressively in the board room, combined with the proper approach to
cyber risk management, implementation of systems and controls against cybersecurity incidents and the
leadership of the Chairman of the Board.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1e.
|
Election of Director: Frances H. Arnold
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1f.
|
Election of Director: R. Martin "Marty"
Chávez
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1g.
|
Election of Director: L. John Doerr
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is
considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit,
Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for
sound corporate governance practice.
F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs
Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for
such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are
centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its
shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the
Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes
that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a
whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the
performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be
proposed in the future.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1h.
|
Election of Director: Roger W. Ferguson Jr.
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1i.
|
Election of Director: Ann Mather
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1j.
|
Election of Director: K. Ram Shriram
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns
or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for
such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are
centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its
shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the
Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes
that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a
whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the
performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be
proposed in the future.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1k.
|
Election of Director: Robin L. Washington
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns
or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for
such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are
centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its
shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the
Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes
that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a
whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the
performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be
proposed in the future.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
2.
|
Ratification of the appointment of Ernst &
Young LLP as Alphabet's independent
registered public accounting firm for the
fiscal year ending December 31, 2023
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor.
Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has
earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model.
After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that
shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST
this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
3.
|
Approval of amendment and restatement of
Alphabet's Amended and Restated 2021
Stock Plan to increase the share reserve by
170,000,000 (post stock split) shares of
Class C capital stock
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: After taking into account the maximum amount of shareholder equity dilution this proposal could
cause, as well as both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that
shareholders should not support the passage of this plan as proposed by the board of directors. We
recommend the board seek to align CEO pay more closely with the performance of the company and work
to reduce the cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. Therefore, we recommend a vote
AGAINST this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
4.
|
Advisory vote to approve compensation
awarded to named executive officers
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we
believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's
directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not
effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote
AGAINST this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
5.
|
Advisory vote on the frequency of advisory
votes to approve compensation awarded to
named executive officers
|
Management
|
1 Year
|
3 Years
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: It is our opinion that an annual say-on-pay vote is the accepted standard for companies today
and a requirement for good corporate governance. Furthermore, we believe that triennial advisory vote on
executive compensation will hinder shareholders from providing the Company with direct input on their
respective compensation philosophy, policies and practices as disclosed in the proxy statement. We do not
concur with the current board's recommendation of a triennial ratification (non-binding vote) on this issue.
We recommend a vote AGAINST the option of triennial (every three years) as the frequency with which
shareholders will be provided an advisory vote on executive compensation.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
6.
|
Stockholder proposal regarding a lobbying
report
|
Shareholder
|
Against
|
Against
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: We believe that it is in the best interests of the Company and the stockholders to belong to
industry associations and coalitions, where the Company benefits from the general business, technical, and
industry standard-setting expertise these organizations provide. We furthermore believe that the proposal
seeks unnecessary line-item disclosure of lobbying expenditures. We believe that the requested report is
unnecessary and would require expenditures and the use of Company resources without providing any
meaningful benefit to the shareholders. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal
and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
7.
|
Stockholder proposal regarding a
congruency report
|
Shareholder
|
Against
|
Against
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: In light of the Company's policies and oversight mechanisms related to its political contributions
and activities, we believe that the shareholder proposal is unnecessary and will not result in any additional
benefit to the shareholders. Rather, the proposal promotes impractical and imprudent actions that would
negatively affect the business and results. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal
and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
8.
|
Stockholder proposal regarding a climate
lobbying report
|
Shareholder
|
Against
|
Against
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: We believe that it is in the best interests of the Company and the stockholders to belong to
industry associations and coalitions, where the Company benefits from the general business, technical, and
industry standard-setting expertise these organizations provide. We furthermore believe that the proposal
seeks unnecessary line-item disclosure of lobbying expenditures. We believe that the requested report is
unnecessary and would require expenditures and the use of Company resources without providing any
meaningful benefit to the shareholders. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal
and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
9.
|
Stockholder proposal regarding a report on
reproductive rights and data privacy
|
Shareholder
|
Against
|
Against
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: We believe that the approval of this proposal would result in the Company incurring
unnecessary costs and potential legal risk by duplicating efforts that are already underway and providing
additional reports with information that is already available to shareholders. After evaluating the details
pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we
recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
10.
|
Stockholder proposal regarding a human
rights assessment of data center siting
|
Shareholder
|
For
|
Against
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: We believe that the adoption of a more comprehensive human rights policy, coupled with
implementation, enforcement, independent monitoring, and transparent, comprehensive reporting will
assure shareholders of the Company's global leadership. We recommend a vote FOR this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
11.
|
Stockholder proposal regarding a human
rights assessment of targeted ad policies
and practices
|
Shareholder
|
For
|
Against
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: We believe that transparency is important for evaluating risks and ensuring that investors and
stakeholders have adequate information necessary to make informed decisions. After evaluating the details
pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we
recommend a vote FOR this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
12.
|
Stockholder proposal regarding algorithm
disclosures
|
Shareholder
|
For
|
Against
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: After evaluating the provisions and tenets of the proposal, we determined that the proposed
resolution contemplated thereby is advisable, substantively and procedurally fair to, and in the best interests
of Company and its shareholders. We recommend a vote FOR this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
13.
|
Stockholder proposal regarding a report on
alignment of YouTube policies with
legislation
|
Shareholder
|
For
|
Against
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: We believe that transparency is important for evaluating risks and ensuring that investors and
stakeholders have adequate information necessary to make informed decisions. After evaluating the details
pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we
recommend a vote FOR this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
14.
|
Stockholder proposal regarding a content
governance report
|
Shareholder
|
For
|
Against
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: We believe that transparency is important for evaluating risks and ensuring that investors and
stakeholders have adequate information necessary to make informed decisions. After evaluating the details
pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we
recommend a vote FOR this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
15.
|
Stockholder proposal regarding a
performance review of the Audit and
Compliance Committee
|
Shareholder
|
Against
|
Against
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: We believe that the proposal is not necessary and is not in the best long-term interest of the
Company and its shareholders. As such, in accordance with Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend
a vote AGAINST this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
16.
|
Stockholder proposal regarding bylaws
amendment
|
Shareholder
|
For
|
Against
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: We believe that approval of this proposal will ensure shareholders can vote on any proposal
that would impose inequitable restrictions. As such, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
17.
|
Stockholder proposal regarding "executives
to retain significant stock"
|
Shareholder
|
For
|
Against
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: Given the foregoing, we believe that requiring senior executives to hold a significant portion of
stock obtained through executive pay plans would focus the executives on the Company's long-term
success. We recommend a vote FOR this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
18.
|
Stockholder proposal regarding equal
shareholder voting
|
Shareholder
|
For
|
Against
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: We believe that shareholder approval is warranted. We oppose such differential voting power
as it may have the effect of denying shareholders the opportunity to vote on matters of critical economic
importance to them. We prefer that companies do not utilize multiple class capital structures to provide
equal voting rights to all shareholders. After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and
in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
COMCAST CORPORATION
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
Security
|
20030N101
|
Meeting Type
|
Annual
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Ticker Symbol
|
CMCSA
|
Meeting Date
|
07-Jun-2023
|
||||||||||||||||||||
ISIN
|
US20030N1019
|
Agenda
|
935845492 - Management
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Record Date
|
03-Apr-2023
|
Holding Recon Date
|
03-Apr-2023
|
||||||||||||||||||||
City /
|
Country
|
/
|
United
States
|
Vote Deadline
|
06-Jun-2023 11:59 PM ET
|
||||||||||||||||||
SEDOL(s)
|
Quick Code
|
||||||||||||||||||||||
Item
|
Proposal
|
Proposed
by
|
Vote
|
Management
Recommendation
|
For/Against
Management
|
||||||||||||||||||
1.
|
DIRECTOR
|
Management
|
|||||||||||||||||||||
1
|
Kenneth J. Bacon
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
|||||||||||||||||||
2
|
Thomas J. Baltimore Jr.
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
|||||||||||||||||||
3
|
Madeline S. Bell
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
|||||||||||||||||||
4
|
Edward D. Breen
|
Withheld
|
For
|
Against
|
|||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns
or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for
such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are
centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its
shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the
Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes
that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a
whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the
performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be
proposed in the future.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
5
|
Gerald L. Hassell
|
Withheld
|
For
|
Against
|
|||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is
considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit,
Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for
sound corporate governance practice.
F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs
Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for
such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are
centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the
Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes
that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a
whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the
performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be
proposed in the future.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
6
|
Jeffrey A. Honickman
|
Withheld
|
For
|
Against
|
|||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is
considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit,
Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for
sound corporate governance practice.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
7
|
Maritza G. Montiel
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
|||||||||||||||||||
8
|
Asuka Nakahara
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
|||||||||||||||||||
9
|
David C. Novak
|
Withheld
|
For
|
Against
|
|||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns
or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for
such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are
centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its
shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the
Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes
that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a
whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the
performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be
proposed in the future.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
10
|
Brian L. Roberts
|
Withheld
|
For
|
Against
|
|||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F21 Combined CEO and Board Chair Positions and the Company Earns a Board Score of
Some Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that there is an inherent potential conflict, in having the CEO or former
CEO serve as the Chairman of the Board. Consequently, we prefer that companies focus on the following
areas to improve its corporate governance practices: separate the roles of the Chairman and CEO, hold
annual director elections, have one class of voting stock only, have key board committees consisting of
independent directors and majority of independent directors on board and include non-binding
compensation vote on agenda to further ensure board independence and accountability.
F22 Chairman of the Board and the Company Earns a Cyber Security Risk Score of Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Chairman of the Board should be held accountable in cases
when the Company obtains the score of Needs Attention on the Cyber Security Risk Score. We believe that
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
cyber security should be critical for all organizations given the rise of the cyber threats and data breaches in
the corporate scene, which could affect any organization's reputation and lead to declined investor
confidence. As such, Egan-Jones believes that in order to avoid risks of data breaches any cybersecurity
weaknesses should be addressed aggressively in the board room, combined with the proper approach to
cyber risk management, implementation of systems and controls against cybersecurity incidents and the
leadership of the Chairman of the Board.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
2.
|
Ratification of the appointment of our
independent auditors.
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor.
Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has
earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model.
After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that
shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST
this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
3.
|
Approval of Comcast Corporation 2023
Omnibus Equity Incentive Plan.
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: After taking into account the maximum amount of shareholder equity dilution this proposal could
cause, as well as both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that
shareholders should not support the passage of this plan as proposed by the board of directors. We
recommend the board seek to align CEO pay more closely with the performance of the company and work
to reduce the cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. Therefore, we recommend a vote
AGAINST this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
4.
|
Approval of Amended and Restated
Comcast Corporation 2002 Employee Stock
Purchase Plan.
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
5.
|
Advisory vote on executive compensation.
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we
believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's
directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not
effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote
AGAINST this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
6.
|
Advisory vote on the frequency of the vote
on executive compensation.
|
Management
|
1 Year
|
1 Year
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
7.
|
To perform independent racial equity audit.
|
Shareholder
|
For
|
Against
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: We believe that the proposal warrants shareholder approval. Here, we find that approval of the
proposal will provide the transparency shareholders need to evaluate such activities. After evaluating the
details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Guidelines, we
recommend a vote FOR this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
8.
|
To report on climate risk in default
retirement plan options.
|
Shareholder
|
For
|
Against
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: After evaluating the provisions and tenets of the proposal, we determined that the proposed
resolution contemplated thereby is advisable, substantively and procedurally fair to, and in the best interests
of Company and its shareholders. We recommend a vote FOR this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
9.
|
To set different greenhouse gas emissions
reduction targets.
|
Shareholder
|
For
|
Against
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: We believe that setting clear-cut goals will help the Company reduce its regulatory risk related
to GHG emissions, financial risk by decreasing volatility of energy prices, and overall expenditure on energy
by implementing a disciplined business strategy to cut emissions from its operations. After evaluating the
details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Guidelines, we
recommend a vote FOR this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
10.
|
To report on political contributions and
company values alignment.
|
Shareholder
|
Against
|
Against
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
11.
|
To report on business in China.
|
Shareholder
|
For
|
Against
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: Investors favor policies and practices that protect and enhance the value of their investments.
There is increasing recognition that company risks related to human rights violations, such as litigation,
reputational damage, and production disruptions, can adversely affect shareholder value. To manage such
risks effectively, companies must assess the risks posed by human rights practices in their operations and
supply chain, as well as by the use of their products. As such, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
AON PLC
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
Security
|
G0403H108
|
Meeting Type
|
Annual
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Ticker Symbol
|
AON
|
Meeting Date
|
16-Jun-2023
|
||||||||||||||||||||
ISIN
|
IE00BLP1HW54
|
Agenda
|
935852726 - Management
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Record Date
|
14-Apr-2023
|
Holding Recon Date
|
14-Apr-2023
|
||||||||||||||||||||
City /
|
Country
|
/
|
United
States
|
Vote Deadline
|
15-Jun-2023 11:59 PM ET
|
||||||||||||||||||
SEDOL(s)
|
Quick Code
|
||||||||||||||||||||||
Item
|
Proposal
|
Proposed
by
|
Vote
|
Management
Recommendation
|
For/Against
Management
|
||||||||||||||||||
1a.
|
Election of Director: Lester B. Knight
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is
considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit,
Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for
sound corporate governance practice.
F22 Chairman of the Board and the Company Earns a Cyber Security Risk Score of Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Chairman of the Board should be held accountable in cases
when the Company obtains the score of Needs Attention on the Cyber Security Risk Score. We believe that
cyber security should be critical for all organizations given the rise of the cyber threats and data breaches in
the corporate scene, which could affect any organization's reputation and lead to declined investor
confidence. As such, Egan-Jones believes that in order to avoid risks of data breaches any cybersecurity
weaknesses should be addressed aggressively in the board room, combined with the proper approach to
cyber risk management, implementation of systems and controls against cybersecurity incidents and the
leadership of the Chairman of the Board.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1b.
|
Election of Director: Gregory C. Case
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1c.
|
Election of Director: Jin-Yong Cai
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some
Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for
such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are
centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its
shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the
Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes
that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a
whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the
performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be
proposed in the future.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1d.
|
Election of Director: Jeffrey C. Campbell
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some
Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for
such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are
centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its
shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the
Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes
that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a
whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the
performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be
proposed in the future.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1e.
|
Election of Director: Fulvio Conti
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is
considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit,
Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for
sound corporate governance practice.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1f.
|
Election of Director: Cheryl A. Francis
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some
Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for
such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are
centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its
shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the
Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes
that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a
whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the
performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be
proposed in the future.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1g.
|
Election of Director: Adriana Karaboutis
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1h.
|
Election of Director: Richard C. Notebaert
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is
considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit,
Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for
sound corporate governance practice.
F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some Concerns or Needs
Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for
such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its
shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the
Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes
that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a
whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the
performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be
proposed in the future.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1i.
|
Election of Director: Gloria Santona
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1j.
|
Election of Director: Sarah E. Smith
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1k.
|
Election of Director: Byron O. Spruell
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some
Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for
such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are
centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its
shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the
Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes
that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a
whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the
performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be
proposed in the future.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1l.
|
Election of Director: Carolyn Y. Woo
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F19 Member of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Score of Some
Concerns or Needs Attention and the Compensation Plan Fails Dilution Model
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for
such a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are
centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its
shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the
Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value. Moreover, Egan-Jones believes
that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such disapproval and that the board as a
whole should seek to align CEO and employee pay more clearly as well as link that pay with the
performance of the company, and work to reduce the potential cost of any similar plan that may be
proposed in the future.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
2.
|
Advisory vote to approve the compensation
of the Company's named executive officers.
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we
believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's
directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not
effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote
AGAINST this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
3.
|
Advisory vote on the frequency of holding
an advisory vote on executive
compensation.
|
Management
|
1 Year
|
1 Year
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
4.
|
Ratify the appointment of Ernst & Young
LLP as the Company's independent
registered public accounting firm for the
fiscal year ending December 31, 2023
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor.
Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has
earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model.
After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that
shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST
this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
5.
|
Re-appoint Ernst & Young Chartered
Accountants as the Company's statutory
auditor under Irish Law
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor.
Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral. This audit firm has earned a
grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model.
After, taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that
shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST
this Resolution.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
6.
|
Authorize the Board or the Audit Committee
of the Board to determine the remuneration
of Ernst & Young Ireland, in its capacity as
the Company's statutory auditor under Irish
law.
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Score we give this auditor.
Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral. This audit firm has earned a
grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model.
After, taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that
shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST
this Resolution.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
7.
|
Approve the Aon plc 2011 Incentive Plan,
as amended and restated.
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: After taking into account the maximum amount of shareholder equity dilution this proposal could
cause, as well as both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that
shareholders should not support the passage of this plan as proposed by the board of directors. We
recommend the board seek to align CEO pay more closely with the performance of the company and work
to reduce the cost of any similar plan that may be proposed in the future. Therefore, we recommend a vote
AGAINST this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
AUTODESK, INC.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
Security
|
052769106
|
Meeting Type
|
Annual
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Ticker Symbol
|
ADSK
|
Meeting Date
|
21-Jun-2023
|
||||||||||||||||||||
ISIN
|
US0527691069
|
Agenda
|
935863351 - Management
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Record Date
|
24-Apr-2023
|
Holding Recon Date
|
24-Apr-2023
|
||||||||||||||||||||
City /
|
Country
|
/
|
United
States
|
Vote Deadline
|
20-Jun-2023 11:59 PM ET
|
||||||||||||||||||
SEDOL(s)
|
Quick Code
|
||||||||||||||||||||||
Item
|
Proposal
|
Proposed
by
|
Vote
|
Management
Recommendation
|
For/Against
Management
|
||||||||||||||||||
1a.
|
Election of Director: Andrew Anagnost
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1b.
|
Election of Director: Karen Blasing
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1c.
|
Election of Director: Reid French
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation
score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1d.
|
Election of Director: Dr. Ayanna Howard
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1e.
|
Election of Director: Blake Irving
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1f.
|
Election of Director: Mary T. McDowell
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation
score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1g.
|
Election of Director: Stephen Milligan
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1h.
|
Election of Director: Lorrie M. Norrington
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1i.
|
Election of Director: Betsy Rafael
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
1j.
|
Election of Director: Rami Rahim
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation
score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such
a poor score and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on
a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders
and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-
term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
1k.
|
Election of Director: Stacy J. Smith
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee
According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is
considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit,
Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for
sound corporate governance practice.
F22 Chairman of the Board and the Company Earns a Cyber Security Risk Score of Needs Attention
Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Chairman of the Board should be held accountable in cases
when the Company obtains the score of Needs Attention on the Cyber Security Risk Score. We believe that
cyber security should be critical for all organizations given the rise of the cyber threats and data breaches in
the corporate scene, which could affect any organization's reputation and lead to declined investor
confidence. As such, Egan-Jones believes that in order to avoid risks of data breaches any cybersecurity
weaknesses should be addressed aggressively in the board room, combined with the proper approach to
cyber risk management, implementation of systems and controls against cybersecurity incidents and the
leadership of the Chairman of the Board.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
2.
|
Ratify the appointment of Ernst & Young
LLP as Autodesk, Inc.'s independent
registered public accounting firm for the
fiscal year ending January 31, 2024.
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Rating we give this auditor.
Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of Neutral or higher. This audit firm has
earned a grade of Needs Attention and thus, has failed to pass our model.
After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that
shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST
this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
3.
|
Approve, on an advisory (non-binding)
basis, the compensation of Autodesk, Inc.'s
named executive officers.
|
Management
|
Against
|
For
|
Against
|
||||||||||||||||||
Comments: After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we
believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's
directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not
effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders. Therefore, we recommend a vote
AGAINST this Proposal.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
4.
|
Approve, on an advisory (non-binding)
basis, the frequency with which
stockholders are provided an advisory (non-
binding) vote on the compensation of
Autodesk, Inc.'s named executive officers.
|
Management
|
1 Year
|
1 Year
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
FIRST AMERICAN FUNDS, INC.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
Security
|
31846V328
|
Meeting Type
|
Special
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Ticker Symbol
|
FXFXX
|
Meeting Date
|
21-Aug-2023
|
||||||||||||||||||||
ISIN
|
US31846V3289
|
Agenda
|
935906935 - Management
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Record Date
|
23-Jun-2023
|
Holding Recon Date
|
23-Jun-2023
|
||||||||||||||||||||
City /
|
Country
|
/
|
United
States
|
Vote Deadline
|
18-Aug-2023 11:59 PM ET
|
||||||||||||||||||
SEDOL(s)
|
Quick Code
|
||||||||||||||||||||||
Item
|
Proposal
|
Proposed
by
|
Vote
|
Management
Recommendation
|
For/Against
Management
|
||||||||||||||||||
1.
|
To approve the Plan of Reorganization,
adopted by the FAF Board, which provides
for the reorganization (each, a
"Reorganization," and collectively, the
"Reorganizations") of each Acquired Fund
with and into a corresponding series of First
American Funds Trust (the "FAF Trust"), a
Massachusetts business trust (each series,
an "Acquiring Fund," and collectively, the
"Acquiring Funds") (the "Reorganization
Proposal").
|
Management
|
For
|
For
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||
TAKE-TWO INTERACTIVE SOFTWARE, INC.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
Security
|
874054109
|
Meeting Type
|
Annual
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Ticker Symbol
|
TTWO
|
Meeting Date
|
21-Sep-2023
|
||||||||||||||||||||
ISIN
|
US8740541094
|
Agenda
|
935910922 - Management
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Record Date
|
25-Jul-2023
|
Holding Recon Date
|
25-Jul-2023
|
||||||||||||||||||||
City /
|
Country
|
/
|
United
States
|
Vote Deadline
|
20-Sep-2023 11:59 PM ET
|
||||||||||||||||||
SEDOL(s)
|
Quick Code
|
||||||||||||||||||||||
Item
|
Proposal
|
Proposed
by
|
Vote
|
Management
Recommendation
|
For/Against
Management
|
||||||||||||||||||
1a.
|
Election of Director: Strauss Zelnick
|
Management
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||||
1b.
|
Election of Director: Michael Dornemann
|
Management
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||||
1c.
|
Election of Director: J Moses
|
Management
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||||
1d.
|
Election of Director: Michael Sheresky
|
Management
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||||
1e.
|
Election of Director: LaVerne Srinivasan
|
Management
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||||
1f.
|
Election of Director: Susan Tolson
|
Management
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||||
1g.
|
Election of Director: Paul Viera
|
Management
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||||
1h.
|
Election of Director: Roland Hernandez
|
Management
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||||
1i.
|
Election of Director: William "Bing" Gordon
|
Management
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||||
1j.
|
Election of Director: Ellen Siminoff
|
Management
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||||
2.
|
Approval, on a non-binding advisory basis,
of the compensation of the Company's
"named executive officers" as disclosed in
the Proxy Statement.
|
Management
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||||
3.
|
Approval, on a non-binding advisory basis,
of the frequency of the advisory vote on the
compensation of the Company's "named
executive officers".
|
Management
|
1 Year
|
||||||||||||||||||||
4.
|
Approval of an amendment and restatement
of the Amended and Restated Take-Two
Interactive Software, Inc. 2017 Stock
Incentive Plan.
|
Management
|
For
|
||||||||||||||||||||
5.
|
Ratification of the appointment of Ernst &
Young LLP as our independent registered
public accounting firm for the fiscal year
ending March 31, 2024.
|
Management
|
For
|
By:
|
/s/ Zachary Tackett |
|
Zac Tackett, President and Principal Executive Officer
|
||
Date:
|
August 24, 2023 |